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

"ARMIES ARE NOT MERE MACHINES"

THE 17TH VERMONT AND 31ST MAINE IN THE SECOND BATTLE OF PETERSBURG

ALEXANDRE F. CAILLOT

"OUR JOB IS TO RESTORE LAW AND ORDER"

THE 175TH MILITARY POLICE BATTALION IN KANSAS CITY, 1968

NED C. HOLT

ARMY HISTORY

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Front cover: A sutler's tent belonging to the 2d Division, IX Corps, near Petersburg, Virginia, ca. November 1864

(Library of Congress)

EDITOR'S JOURNAL

In the Summer 2023 issue of *Army History*, I am pleased to present two engaging articles, a great selection of book reviews, a visit to the 82d Airborne Division War Memorial Museum, and a look at a unique Army artifact.

The first article, by Alexandre Caillot, explores the activities of the 17th Vermont and 31st Maine Volunteer Infantries before and during the Second Battle of Petersburg. These units mostly were made up of later enlistees, including those who felt compelled to serve lest they be drafted. Other Army soldiers who had been in the service longer often maligned these "late comers." Later, historians disparaged them as well. However, as the author shows, the soldiers in these particular units acquitted themselves well, enduring hardships, forced marches, and brutal battles.

The second article, by Ned Holt, an active-duty Army officer stationed in Okinawa, Japan, examines the role of the 175th Military Police Battalion during the riots in Kansas City, Missouri, following the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. in 1968. Holt details the planning, deployment, riot patrols, and eventual recall of this Missouri Army National Guard unit. He shows how preparation and execution of said plans helped these troops accomplish their mission in very difficult circumstances.

This issue's Museum Feature pays a visit to the 82d Airborne Division War Memorial Museum at Fort Liberty, North Carolina, and offers a glimpse both inside and outside of the museum. The Artifact Spotlight highlights a rare artifact: a ring captured during the war against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Many ISIS fighters wear such rings, and Syrian allies presented this particular example to the commanding general of the XVIII Airborne Corps and Combined Joint Task Force–Inherent Resolve.

In the last issue, I mentioned that we were planning on publishing an article on the battle for Mosul, Iraq, in 2016–2017. This article was held up in security review, but we now expect to publish it in the upcoming Fall 2023 issue.

Readers of *Army History* may notice that the next few issues will be coming out very close together. This is due to our continuing efforts to get back on track as far as our production schedule is concerned. We hope to resume a normal publishing schedule with regular on-time releases early in the new year.

I would also like to encourage our audience to keep an eye out for our Fall 2023 issue as *Army History* will be celebrating its 40th anniversary. We are very proud of this upcoming milestone and plan to have a couple of celebratory special features. A lot has changed in the last forty years and *Army History* continues to evolve as we work to provide engaging, interesting, and timely content.

I will end by reminding readers that the 250th anniversary of the Revolutionary War is approaching, and we are still looking for submissions to highlight this important period in our nation's history.

BRYAN J. HOCKENSMITH
Managing Editor

AH SUMMER 2023 ARMY HISTORY

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THE CHIEF'S CORNER

CHARLES R. BOWERY JR.

FOUR SIGNIFICANT ARMY ANNIVERSARIES

The year 2023 marks four significant anniversaries for the United States Army. In June 1948, President Harry S. Truman issued Executive Order 9981, which directed the desegregation of the United States armed forces and marked another milestone on the Army's continuing path toward diversity and inclusion. This journey continues today, seventy-five years after the order, because there can never be an end to our efforts to ensure that we afford opportunities to all who want to serve and excel.

Twenty-five years after Truman's executive order, the year 1973 marked a period of epochal change in the U.S. Army. On 29 March, the last U.S. Army operational units left Vietnam, ending America's ground combat role in that war. On 1 July, the U.S. military became an all-volunteer force, ending some thirty years of conscription, and the Army activated its Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) at Fort Monroe, Virginia. TRADOC would henceforth become the Army's major command focused on producing trained and prepared people and units for the all-volunteer Army. Fifty years later, TRADOC is now a four-star Army Command with end-to-end responsibility for recruiting, developing, and maintaining the Army's people, doctrine, training, education, and future concepts.

Although they mark distinct events, these four anniversaries are intertwined in significant ways. They represent how the U.S. Army has met its missions since the end of World War II, in an increasingly uncertain and dangerous world marked first by the Cold War competition with the Soviet Union and China, and then by the confrontation with nationalism and violent extremism after the fall of the Soviet Union. As our leaders frequently remark, the U.S. Army's most important system and capability is its people, and our diversity and inclusion as a force is the key element of our strength and readiness. The fairness and inclusion that President Truman drove with his executive order has found voice in our modern volunteer Army, but this process has not been without its challenges, as we see now in recent struggles to recruit the Army of the future.

Historians have a role in helping our leaders and our nation to understand these struggles. Although historical work on the Army's conflicts, campaigns, and battles will always have a place in our portfolio, we now need historians to train their lenses on the Army's institutional history and development. Only in this way can our leaders maintain a sense of context and deep understanding that will drive smart decisions on the force of the next fifty years. *Army History* magazine will continue to be a home for innovative subjects and approaches that capture the full spectrum of the U.S. Army's past in an approachable, attractive, and entertaining format.

For more information, see the following publications:
Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940–1965
MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Withdrawl, 1968–1973
The U.S. Army's Transition to the All-Volunteer Force, 1968–1974
Victory Starts Here: A Short 50-Year of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command







NEWSNOTES

George C. Herring Jr. (1936–2022)

George C. Herring Jr. was the father of Vietnam War studies and a pillar in the diplomatic history field. A native of Blacksburg, Virginia, he graduated from Roanoke College in 1957 and served in the Navy before earning his PhD (1965) from the University of Virginia. After four years at Ohio University, in 1969 he began thirty-six years at the University of Kentucky, receiving teaching awards, advising thirty-five doctoral students, and chairing the history department. His *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), currently in its sixth edition, has become a fixture in classrooms and probably has taught more Americans about the conflict than any other book. Arguably his greatest work, however, was *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (Oxford University Press, 2008), a magisterial, evenhanded synthesis that received the 2009 Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize for best book on American diplomatic history. A founder of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR), he served as its president and as editor of *Diplomatic History*, and in 2002 won SHAFR's Norman and Laura Graebner Award for lifetime achievement. He contributed much to the Army Historical Program, serving on the Historical Advisory Committee and writing an essay on the Battle of the Ia Drang for *America's First Battles, 1776–1965* (University Press of Kansas, 1986). One of his final pieces was an article for *Army History* on Operation Lam Son 719, the invasion of Laos. A graceful gentleman, George sought out and encouraged younger scholars without a trace of condescension. He will be missed greatly.

John F. Prados (1951–2022)

John F. Prados could have originated the phrase "independent scholar"—he wrote twenty-seven books on intelligence, Vietnam, and World War II, and he was certainly an unfettered thinker. Born in Queens, New York, he grew up in Puerto Rico and considered going to West Point. Instead, he attended Columbia University, where he became an antiwar activist immersed in the upheaval of the era. Graduating in 1973, he earned his doctorate in political science from Columbia in 1982; his dissertation on Soviet strategic forces became his first book, *The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Soviet Strategic Forces* (Princeton University Press, 1982). For a time, he designed board games; "Rise and Fall of the Third Reich" was one of the most popular of its kind. However, he really made his name with his writing, notably *Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II* (Random House, 1995), *Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945–1975* (University Press of Kansas, 2009), and *The Ghosts of Langley: Into the CIA's Heart of Darkness* (The New Press, 2017). In 1997, he became a senior fellow at George Washington University's National Security Archive, a research institute that pushes for records declassification, largely through Freedom of Information Act requests. It was an endeavor close to John's heart. He felt deeply that the American people had a need and a right to know their history. Despite his activist past, he could work with people of many convictions. Army historians will miss him.

New Publication from AUSA

On Wednesday, 31 May, the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) announced the release of its latest entry in the Medal of Honor graphic novel series: *Medal of Honor: Samuel Woodfill*. General John J. Pershing recognized Samuel Woodfill as the most outstanding soldier of World War I. When his company came under fire during a battle of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, Woodfill took out several machine-gun nests with a rifle, a pistol, and a pickax. Pershing personally presented Woodfill with the Medal of Honor and later handpicked him to dedicate the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Arlington National Cemetery. To read *Medal of Honor: Samuel Woodfill* online or download a free copy, please visit www.ausa.org/woodfill.



"ARMIES ARE NOT MERE MACHINES"

The 17th Vermont and 31st Maine in the Second Battle of Petersburg

By Alexandre F. Caillot

A sketch of the IX Corps assault on the Shand House by Edwin A. Forbes
(*Archive.org*)

In an 1877 Memorial Day speech, Civil War veteran Lyman E. Knapp defended the reputation of soldiers who had joined the U.S. Army in the second half of the conflict. By this time, the American populace had borne witness to the grim human toll of such fighting. He thus declared that the Federal volunteer "was consciously signing his own death warrant. . . . Many did not enlist cooly, or soberly. Some may have been mercenary. But . . . there must have been a higher and stronger motive." Knapp spoke from personal experience, having completed his service as a major in the 17th Regiment Vermont Volunteers. Decades after the war, Leander Otis Merriam also reflected proudly on the history of his later arrival outfit, the 31st Regiment Infantry, Maine Volunteers. This one-time sergeant major wrote that "it may well be doubted if any of the old and veteran regiments can show such an appalling story of desperate fighting and frightful loss as this Maine organization which crowded its story into less than one half the term for which it was mustered."[1]

Major Knapp
(*U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center*)

Since the 1950s, numerous historians have depicted the U.S. Army's late arrivals as unpatriotic mercenaries—taking note that many were foreigners—and none deserving the praise heaped on the purportedly altruistic "Boys of '61," who enlisted at the war's start. Scholars focus their criticism on the consequences of the March 1863 Enrollment Act, the U.S. Army draft law. This legislation instituted an approach to recruiting that involved the use of high bounties, conscription, and substitution—whereby a draftee paid someone to take his place. The characteristics of this system subjected the later arrivals to the charge that they lacked the patriotism of their predecessors. Among a litany of purported flaws, this infusion of unsoldierly and self-interested types proved more apt to desert than fight well. Nowhere was this more true than in the Army of the Potomac, which saw only half of its veterans reenlist in the spring and summer of 1864. Therefore, the field army that trapped Confederate General Robert E. Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia at Appomattox, sealing the fate of the rebellion in April 1865, contained a high proportion of supposedly poor combatants. This is a significant allegation, because the fate of Federal arms relied so heavily on the numbers that these later arrivals provided. Supporting this point, 50 percent of the soldiers from the Army of the Potomac who participated in the May 1865 Grand Review in Washington, D.C., the Union victory parade at the war's end, had not spent more than a year in uniform. The academic consensus on later arrivals rests upon a disparaging generalization of the approximately 820,000 Federals who helped

The flag of the 31st Regiment Infantry, Maine Volunteers
(*Maine State Museum*)

The flag of the 17th Regiment, Vermont Volunteers
(*Digital Vermont*)

to fill the ranks. This figure does not include the roughly 180,000 Black troops who also served, nearly all between 1863 and 1865. Historians have not submitted the later arrivals to a comprehensive book-length treatment, but those soldiers continue to be treated contemptuously in studies of the common soldier's experience, the Overland (May–June 1864) and Petersburg (June 1864–April 1865) Campaigns, the draft and community mobilization, as well as in broad war narratives.[2]

General Lee
(*Library of Congress*)

This article examines the role of the 17th Vermont and 31st Maine in the first week of the Petersburg Campaign in Virginia. These New Englanders had already become hardened combatants in the Army of the Potomac. They fought as part of the 2d Brigade, 2d Division of the IX Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside. A fair proportion of the officers and soldiers in each outfit had previously donned the uniform, comprising 21 percent of those who served in the 17th throughout its history and 12 percent of those in the 31st. The rest were greenhorns, most of whom received their baptism of fire in the Overland Campaign across four engagements in just six weeks. This stressful experience justified a newspaper correspondent from the 17th who claimed that it was "old at least as a fighting regiment." Technically, this was not a full regiment of ten companies, but a battalion of eight companies, one of which only reached the front on 8 June. The 31st was just as battle-scarred as its counterpart from the Green Mountain State. Departing the Cold Harbor Battlefield on 12 June 1864, both units would go on to engage the enemy in the Second Battle of Petersburg (15–18 June 1864). These Federals could steel themselves with the knowledge that the bloodshed they had previously sustained was advancing the cause of U.S. victory. As 1st Lt. John P. Sheahan of the 31st admitted, a grueling period of "many months" lay ahead, but at least "the Rebels have been pushed back, the days of disorderly retreat are over." To keep up this high operational tempo, the later arrivals would have to persevere against the Army of Northern Virginia, whose defensive skill had exacted a heavy toll in past assaults. These bluecoats



General Burnside
(*Library of Congress*)

Lieutenant Sheahan
(*Digital Maine*)

at least benefited from seasoned leadership during the arduous beginning of this campaign, including Brig. Gen. Simon G. Griffin, commanding the brigade, and Brig. Gen. Robert B. Potter, in charge of the division.[3] The story of the 17th and 31st defies expectations. They scored the greatest tactical success of their field history at Second Petersburg, performing solidly in combat given the difficulties they faced. Although the Federals failed to capture that Virginia city, the rank and file could not be held responsible for this dismal outcome. The command decisions of U.S. generals had a greater effect on the course of the battle—especially their insistence on driving the worn-out army forward as it approached the limits of what they could accomplish without a break. Worn down in number and spirit by active campaigning, the New Englanders maintained their unit cohesion while absorbing casualties and achieving their objective. The later arrivals' most notable accomplishment was their ability to endure this exhausting period, an important contribution to the success of the Northern cause.

Later arrivals deserve a reappraisal, for their military service offers insights into the nature of the Army of the Potomac, which crushed the Confederacy in the last ten-and-a-half months of the conflict. Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, commanding general of the Federal armies, achieved victory by using this army to apply continuous pressure on the enemy. His soldiers sustained 42,000 casualties in the Petersburg Campaign. This extended and largely stalemated fight against the entrenched Army of Northern Virginia differed markedly from the comparatively fluid and mobile engagements that typically had occurred between 1861 and 1863. In response to these trying circumstances, the bluecoats grew increasingly resistant to the prospect of throwing themselves against fortified Confederates. This was especially true of those soldiers with expiring enlistments who had tired of the endless slaughter. Contemporaries and scholars who derided the later arrivals did not consider how they conducted themselves under fire after maturing into seasoned troops. Reconsidering the combat performance of the Vermonters and Mainers helps to answer a fundamental question about the path to U.S. victory: how did the Army of the Potomac, with presumably lackluster soldiers taking the place of a dwindling number of worn-out veterans, defeat the Army of Northern Virginia?[4]

Determining the contribution of the later arrivals speaks to the resiliency of the constitutional republic during its greatest crisis. This was not the first time that the American people found their resolve tested in a lengthy conflict. When the War of Independence began, a widespread rebellious zeal, or rage militaire, gripped Patriot supporters, but it only lasted through 1776. The Northern population experienced this same ardor in response to the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter, South Carolina, in April 1861. Citizens felt compelled to serve, harking back to the revolutionary generation as they strove to preserve the country. They framed the cause as a defense of liberal democracy with global stakes. Yet this sense of enthusiasm for the Civil War also faded quickly, which put the onus on the later arrivals to sustain the drive toward victory. The ability of Federal leaders to achieve their war aims depended on this fresh manpower performing well in combat and continuing to do so over time.[5]

The later arrivals began this period with the greatest endurance trial of their service. General Grant launched the campaign to attack Petersburg, a railroad center, to curtail the logistics of the Army of Northern Virginia. According to Bvt. Brig. Gen. Adam Badeau, Grant's secretary, by

General Griffin
(*National Archives*)

taking Petersburg, "Lee could not remain one week in Richmond, or on the northern side" of the James River. Imposing this level of strain on the Rebels would advance Grant's objective of crushing the enemy host. To approach Petersburg, he ordered the Army of the Potomac to depart the Cold Harbor Battlefield and flank left around the opposing force. Then, the soldiers would cross the James to its south bank and continue to the city. The subsequent fighting there would inaugurate the Second Petersburg battle. Maj. Gen. William Farrar Smith, commanding the XVIII Corps in the Army of the James, was

General Potter
(*Library of Congress*)



General Grant
(*Library of Congress*)

Adam Badeau, shown here as a colonel
(*Library of Congress*)

to strike the first blow against the enemy on 15 June. Over the following days, Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, commander of the Army of the Potomac, would commit his troops to a large-scale assault to take the city before Lee could bolster the Rebel defenders sufficiently and condemn the Federals to a lengthy siege.[6]

Leaving Cold Harbor on the evening of 12 June, the Vermonters and Mainers undertook a grueling 68-mile, four-day trek to reach their entrenchments near Petersburg. General Meade expected the IX Corps to "move promptly and quickly," which proved impossible given the challenges of the journey. The troops made do with limited food as they suffered through high temperatures and humidity, dust, biting insects, and sandy roads more akin to rude footpaths. They pushed on through long hours on the move and night marches, including a two-day stretch with no more than four hours of sleep. Still, the 17th and 31st only managed to travel 35 miles in twenty-six hours, including a one-hour stop. Several delays along the way helped to explain this sluggish pace of 1.3 miles per hour. The soldiers paused once to entrench, had to coordinate their movements with wagons and other bluecoats on the road, and awaited the completion of a bridge to cross the James. Despite these obstacles, the New Englanders did not have much opportunity to recuperate until 15 June. They halted for most of that day due to the construction of another bridge and the arrival of wagons carrying rations. The troops were able to wash themselves and try to relax despite surroundings that Lt. Col. Charles Cummings, commanding the 17th, optimistically described as "a delightful plantation."[7]

The New Englanders began the 22-mile forced march that constituted the last leg of their trek on the evening of 15 June. Typically, they stopped for five minutes per hour of travel, whereupon they would fall asleep and struggle to wake and continue the journey. These troops finally enjoyed a break of some two hours overnight when General Burnside halted the corps to determine the way forward and to allow for the movement of wagons. Nevertheless, straggling and heat exhaustion were pervasive, as revealed during a roughly two-hour stop for breakfast the next day. Only four to eight Vermonters per company in the 17th reported for duty. Alternatively, Capt. Eldin J. Hartshorn offered a larger head count of approximately seventy-five soldiers for the 17th, which exceeded the present-for-duty strength of any other unit in General Griffin's command. Not including officers, this nevertheless represented only about one-fourth of the Vermonters' available manpower for combat on 10 June. Along the way, ambulances and the rear guard collected worn-out and sick troops who had collapsed, but the Rebel capture of one Vermont private highlighted the risk of falling behind. Straggling was not necessarily a sign of poor unit cohesion; as historian Kathryn Shively observes, this type of behavior "enabled . . . self-care, such as foraging or locating clean water."[8]

General Meade
(*Library of Congress*)

Colonel Cummings
(*Library of Congress*)

Captain Hartshorn
(*Digital Vermont*)

The tired soldiers finally reached the outskirts of Petersburg on 16 June. Lt. Col. Theodore L. Lyman, General Meade's aide-de-camp, claimed they were suffering "without water, broken by a severe march, scorched by the sun, and covered with a suffocating dust." Indeed, the Vermonters were in poor shape, for Colonel Cummings complained that his "ranks . . . [were] rapidly depleted from hard marching on very short rations." First Lt. Joel H. Lucia, reflecting on the history of the 17th, judged this to be "the most severe march of its entire service." The Mainers were also in a lamentable state, having already consumed their half rations before the trek ended. Pvt. Horatio Fox Smith decried this "very fatiguing" and "fearfully hard march" in which "men dropped dead in their tracks." Even a lieutenant in the much older 11th Regiment, New Hampshire Volunteer Infantry, judged this to be "the hardest night's march we ever made." General Griffin's troops were fortunate to enjoy a break long enough to brew coffee and recuperate somewhat, with further opportunities to rest as they arrayed themselves on the Union left in front of the city. This change in position reflected General Grant's order to be ready "as soon as possible either for attack or defense." Despite the urgent command, General Burnside's slower rate of march delayed a Federal assault during Second Petersburg. Not until 1800 did the Vermonters and Mainers support an attack by the II Corps on Confederate entrenchments 2½ miles east of the city. When this offensive failed, Griffin's troops shifted their position to the Union right. Rushing through a mile of undergrowth on uneven ground, they braved enemy rifle musket and artillery fire to occupy terrain that other bluecoats had already captured. Although the fighting sputtered out around 2100, skirmishing continued until midnight as the Rebels tried to retake the lost ground. The later arrivals had no time to recover, for they entrenched and served as pickets less than 165 feet away from their foe.[9]

On the morning of 17 June, the Vermonters and Mainers would face a test of their willingness to storm entrenchments. After making several costly assaults during the Overland Campaign, it remained to be seen whether they had the fortitude to do so again. General Potter had orders to capture the Confederate works facing his 2d Division. He gave General Griffin the responsibility for organizing the attack, but the troops had little warning of their role, receiving word of it only at midnight. They concentrated before the Shand House, which stood upon the tip of a piece of land jutting out about a half-mile toward the Federals. Two ravines with brooks running through them bordered the area. Griffin's

Horatio Fox Smith, shown here in civilian clothing
(*Digital Maine*)



troops, who composed the right flank of the division, would attack the northern face of this salient in the Rebel line, while Potter's 1st Brigade focused on its eastern face. Passing through one of the ravines, the later arrivals would climb its roughly 20-foot bank to confront what a sergeant in the 9th Regiment, New Hampshire Volunteer Infantry, described as "extensive, well built, and complete" enemy fortifications. These fieldworks included rifle pits, a four-gun battery behind the home and its outbuildings, a six-gun redoubt that could fire along the brigade's left flank, and an elevated two-gun redan. Still, the Union combatants were favorably situated to attack the salient. The undulating terrain liable to slow the soldiers' progress would also serve to cover their approach.[10]

Auguring poorly for the fight ahead, the 17th and 31st were reduced in strength. Past experience stressed the importance of ample troops to withstand the heavy losses incurred while attacking enemy defenses. Available manpower estimates for the two units did not specify the number of officers. Colonel Cummings counted only 135 Vermonters present for duty—or 22 percent of the whole unit as of 10 June. Private Smith listed roughly 150 Maine soldiers present for duty, although it is not possible to determine what percentage of the total this represented due to a lack of morning reports. Disease was chiefly responsible for whittling down the number of New Englanders, because they were more vulnerable to maladies than long-serving Federals. As most of the later arrivals had not spent time in older units, their immune systems were still adapting to the unhygienic realities of life in uniform. According to General Meade, "the heat, hard service, bad water, and swampy regions" negatively affected the well-being of his troops. Other contributing factors included a lack of food and sleep, living without shelter, intense marching, and gunshot wounds that had left their weakened victims more likely to suffer a future ailment.[11]

The later arrivals consequently approached their next clash with grim determination. Five thousand Federals were necessary to make this assault according to an army estimate, but only 2,000 troops had been employed in the unsuccessful bid to capture the ground the night before. Exhausted and few in number, General Griffin still expected these New Englanders to seize a well-fortified enemy position. Although contemporary historian John C. Ropes claimed the "troops were in good condition," the circumstances justified the pessimism of a II Corps brigade commander who likened the attack on the Shand House to the ill-fated Charge of the Light Brigade in the Crimean War. Colonel Cummings echoed this bleak outlook, for he did not believe he personally would survive the encounter. Reflecting on the inadvisability of the pending assault, Cummings railed that "it was Burnside's order, made as too often such orders are upon information furnished by some incompetent popinjay on the staff who comes into some safe place and looks a minute when all is quiet." Even Private Smith alluded to a widespread belief "that the corps placed in advance in an attack on such fearfully strong works . . . must suffer terribly." Still, as Sergeant Major Merriam explained, delaying the offensive would allow the Confederates time to improve their defenses such that "twenty four more hours could see us confronted by another Cold Harbor." That prospect surely encouraged the rank and file to persevere lest they experience a repeat of the infamous Union defeat.[12]

Good leadership may have steeled the resolve of the Vermonters and Mainers further. Private Smith would subsequently describe General Griffin as "our old hero," which suggests that his presence instilled confidence in the members of the 2d Brigade. The officers and troops of the

Leander Otis Merriam, shown here as a sergeant
(*Digital Maine*)

31st thought highly of their regimental commander, Maj. Daniel White, who had led them through two prior engagements. Near the end of the fighting at Cold Harbor, these Mainers had urged Griffin to request White's rise in rank to colonel. Griffin concurred and declared him to be "a brave, able & efficient commander," resulting in the Mainer's promotion in early July. The members of the 17th could draw comfort in the knowledge that Colonel Cummings, who had led them through most of the Overland Campaign, would do so again this day. He also advocated the promotion of Orderly Sgt. Henry D. Jordan to second lieutenant. Cummings not only praised his general performance but specified that "his character is excellent and his influence good."[13]

Strict discipline remained necessary to maintain the element of surprise in this attack. After midnight, General Griffin's soldiers stealthily traversed thickets and fallen trees to enter the ravine along the northern face of the salient less than 200 yards from the Confederate defenses. Griffin deployed his Federals into two lines. He regarded the 17th as his most dependable outfit and placed it along the right flank in front, where he anticipated the most intense combat. Meanwhile, Griffin positioned the 31st on the right end of the second line. The troops were careful to whisper as Rebel pickets were nearby. In further preparation, these bluecoats stowed dinnerware in haversacks to stifle rattling, removed firing caps from rifle muskets, fixed bayonets, and then collapsed into slumber.[14]

The later arrivals caught the enemy off guard with an early morning charge. At 0300, they arose and climbed the ravine bank, traversing the area crowded by an entrenched II Corps brigade. General Griffin's troops then reformed their lines and advanced double quick with what early IX Corps historian Augustus B. Woodbury called "the fury of a tornado." Sunrise illuminated the attackers, but most of the Confederates remained asleep. When the oncoming bluecoats neared the high ground, however, some of the dozing graybacks awakened and grabbed their weapons. The Rebels unleashed a scattered picket fire, followed by a haphazard infantry volley from their trench line, and what Private Smith described as "a perfect tempest of grape and canister" from several cannons. According to Sergeant Major Merriam, those enemy projectiles "finished many a poor fellow," including 1st Lt. Guy H. Guyer of the 17th, who suffered a fatal gunshot while leading his troops onward. Although this fire struck down Federals in the first line, the Rebels had poor aim and thus shot over the heads of the combatants in the second line. The 31st still tallied nine casualties, however, as some Maine soldiers had outpaced their comrades to enter the first line during the advance. This enemy opposition caused the nearest Union troops to hesitate, so their comrades in the rear rushed forward in support. With this surge of bluecoats, the Vermonters and Mainers used their bayonets to help drive back the Rebel occupants from the fieldworks in just fifteen minutes. They impaled those who resisted the onslaught. As Captain Knapp of the 17th remarked, "It is said that bayonet wounds are seldom known; but I can vouch for many that were made that early morning." First Lt. George Hicks of the 17th inspired his comrades by seizing a Confederate regiment's flag, a feat that justified his subsequent brevet to captain. First Sgt. Samuel Busley and Sgt. H. G. Smith, both of the 31st, also offered courageous examples that partially underpinned their recommendations for promotion.[15]

Daniel White, shown here as a colonel
(*Digital Maine*)

The assault now petered out. For a short while, the New Englanders chased and shot at the Confederates, who retreated some 2 miles. Colonel Cummings recalled that the Rebels "broke and [ran] like sheep" across an open field. The Federals halted when they encountered what General Burnside termed a "very strong position" situated along Harrison Creek. From the safety of these entrenchments, the enemy opened fire with rifle muskets and masked batteries. As Sergeant Major Merriam recalled, "solid shot, shells, grape, cannister and minnies came in lively shape." Pressing forward would have obligated General Griffin's men to brave this deadly storm of projectiles while crossing some 400 yards of open ground. Instead, the bluecoats withdrew and dug in to gain protection from the missiles. A majority of the Mainers were nonplussed about the cannon fire, an attitude likely shared by the Vermonters. Once the graybacks realized this Union attack had ended, they slowed their shooting. For the rest of the day, the later arrivals performed tasks that proved less demanding while the Confederates kept up intermittent artillery and small arms fire. Some Vermonters and Mainers skirmished near the Rebels. The rest of the 17th, plus the 31st, stood downhill roughly 200 yards distant from the enemy, whose



guns fired too high to cause injury. The Federals constructed earthworks, then changed position that afternoon when General Potter relieved the 2d Brigade from the front line. The two outfits then worked again on field fortifications, benefiting from an example of motivating leadership. Lieutenant Sheahan of the 31st took part in the entrenching effort that day, which inspired his troops to yell their appreciation. The later arrivals also profited from time spent recuperating, prepared to support Burnside's 1st and 3d Divisions, and skirmished more that night.[16]

The last day of the battle, 18 June, involved little fighting for the Vermonters and Mainers. At 0400, the depleted men pushed forward a half-mile in high humidity and under Confederate artillery fire to support an advance by the 3d Division. Some later arrivals temporarily served as pickets under Capt. J. N. Jones of the 6th Regiment, New Hampshire Volunteer Infantry, who led a force of roughly 100 troops drawn from General Griffin's command. These select Federals advanced around 0700 and halted just under 1,000 feet away from the Rebel rifle pits, enduring sharp fire along the way. Jones drove his pickets farther ahead than originally planned, then directed them to shoot at the enemy from the protection of a fence. Cpl. Almeron C. Inman of the 17th showed courage during this exchange, helping to justify his subsequent recommendation for the Medal of Honor, although he did not ultimately receive it. Pursuant to orders, Jones instructed the bluecoats to retreat at 1000. The rest of the 17th and 31st spent the day along a wood line protecting a Union battery, to be joined by the pickets upon their return to the brigade. They were fortunate to have less difficult duties on 18 June, for late in the day, General Burnside emphasized his troops were in such bad shape that "it [was] necessary to move carefully and to keep the men well in hand." Once the engagement finally ended, the 2d Division advanced that night to assume control over most of the corps frontage, with some Vermonters and Mainers serving as pickets. After four days of combat, the Federals had failed to capture Petersburg, leaving the survivors to ponder the meaning of their sacrifice.[17]

Second Petersburg, and the 17 June assault in particular, proved costly for the later arrivals. General Meade downplayed the bloody toll sustained by his army, arguing that these casualties simply reflected the scale of the combat. Despite this explanation to General Grant, he wrote candidly to his wife that the "loss is severe, and shows how hard the fighting was." General Potter adopted an optimistic tack, asserting that the price paid was modest in exchange for what his soldiers had won. Yet, the combat had reduced the present-for-duty strength in both units by about one-fifth, a high cost given that they were so understrength. The 17th tallied twenty-nine officers and troops killed or wounded, while the 31st suffered thirty-two commissioned and enlisted casualties. Notably, officers made up a proportionate share of these losses. Their casualty rate in the 17th and 31st closely matched that of the entire 2d Brigade between 16 and 17 June, in which 7 percent of those killed, wounded, or missing were officers. This could suggest that many did not feel their troops needed to be led from the front. Such heroic displays would have placed these officers at greater risk from enemy fire. It is also possible that they had to remain behind their lines to drive hesitant soldiers onward, although there is no record of such coercion that day. Moreover, combatants who previously had served in other outfits did not amount to a dispro-



Colonel Comstock
(*Library of Congress*)

portionately large number of the casualties, which indicates that first-time enlistees persevered instead of shirking their duty. The more seasoned Vermonters equaled 28 percent of losses in the 17th, which was slightly higher than the ratio of such experienced combatants who ever served in this unit. Likewise, 13 percent of the Maine casualties consisted of individuals with previous stints in uniform, which about equaled the portion of those grizzled Federals serving at one time or another in the Maine outfit.[18]

The New Englanders secured a large portion of the U.S. Army gains, which partially explained the bloodshed they suffered. General Griffin's men, along with the 1st Brigade of the 2d Division, seized about a mile of the Confederate fieldworks, approximately 600 Rebels and 1,500 stands of small arms, ammunition, four guns with twenty-four horses, an unspecified number of caissons, and the colors of five enemy units. Of this total, the Vermonters laid claim to seventy-one graybacks, one set of colors, one cannon, a caisson, and six horses. The Mainers took a caisson, one limber, seven horses, and at least fifty-two Confederates. The results of this attack proved to be the highlight of Federal efforts during Second Petersburg.[19]

Previous experiences in uniform reduced the combat performance of the later arrivals. Tactical success at the Shand House did not mean these New Englanders were unfazed by their prior exertions or keen to pit themselves against a fortified enemy. Rather, General Griffin had decided upon a bayonet charge that caught most of the Rebels unawares, introducing an element of surprise that compensated for the Federals' deteriorating condition. Lt. Col. Cyrus B. Comstock, General Grant's aide-de-camp, expressed a contrarian view by insisting the Union soldiers had shown no decline in their fighting ability. More plausible was Grant's own admission that the humble privates in the Army of the Potomac had reached the end of their tether by contending that "all has been done that could be done." General Meade agreed and remarked that these bluecoats had lost energy and gumption since the Battle of the Wilderness (5–6 May 1864). Contemporary historian Ropes expanded on this point, alluding to "the opinion of many observers that the constant attacks . . . did . . . demoralize the troops." According to this interpretation, the surviving combatants had grown reluctant to take the offensive. Colonel Lyman blamed the heavy casualties sustained by the officers and troops plus the exhaustion of these soldiers, for having reduced "morale and discipline and skill."[20]

Still, U.S. Army officers and the press celebrated the performance of the bluecoats at the Shand House. A soldier in the 11th New Hampshire proudly related that General Grant issued "an order [in which he] complimented the men for their bravery and their daring deeds," while General Meade enthused that "their persistence and success is highly creditable." A similar tone prevailed within the IX Corps. General Burnside lauded his troops and cited "the high appreciation in which their services . . . are held at the headquarters of the army." Generals Potter and Griffin also praised the Vermonters and Mainers. More expansive was Burnside's secretary, Capt. Daniel Larned, the assistant adjutant general of the IX Corps, who stated that "the noble fellows only waited to be told what was required, and they went at it with a courage that accomplished more than was designed." Even officers in the 17th and 31st reflected proudly on the charge. Colonel Cummings noted the fortitude of his battalion and insisted he could have secured any objective if he had his full complement of 800 at hand. Three fellow Mainers, Adjutant and 1st Lt. William B. Allyn, Capt. James Dean, and Capt. George A. Bolton, celebrated the impressive comportment of the soldiers in the 31st.[21]

The example of the Vermonters and Mainers supports the view that the later arrivals sustained the Army of the Potomac during the Petersburg Campaign. This is contrary to the historiographic consensus in which unsavory skulkers typically replaced the vaunted "Boys of '61." Reappraising the service of these Federals with an eye toward the challenges of life in uniform humanizes their experience, and restores the agency of those who fought as well as could be expected under such difficult circumstances. The experience of the New Englanders at Second Petersburg proved the truth of historian Woodbury's admonition that "armies are not mere machines. They are composed of ordinary flesh and blood." Admittedly, Confederate fire caused the Vermonters to waver, but this was expected of such fatigued soldiers well-versed in the danger of frontal attacks. Yet, during this brief pause, the Mainers

displayed unit cohesion by forging onward with the rest of the second line to help the front line continue the assault. The two outfits went on to achieve their objective of seizing the Rebel position at the Shand House. This served to bring the 2d Division closer to Petersburg than the rest of the army, except for parts of the 1st and 3d Divisions that pushed ahead later on 17 June. Such forward progress imperiled the enemy's position and put the IX Corps artillery within range to fire on the city. Helping to explain these achievements, the 17th and 31st proved capable of withstanding intense fire. The heavy casualties they sustained did not deter them from making sizable gains during this battle. Such Federals were too taxed physically and mentally, however, to take Petersburg by assault. They would spend the next ten months besieging the city until it fell on 3 April 1865. This collapse, which foreshadowed the end of the Confederacy, would have been impossible without the valiant example of the later arrivals at the Shand House and the many other battlefields that traced a bloody path to a U.S. victory. Persevering against all odds was the chief accomplishment of these soldiers, who marched, fought, and died in moving testimony to the willpower of Billy Yank. It is time that historians recognize this effort for what it was: a level of sacrifice without which the Union could not have survived.[22]

Dr. Alexandre F. Caillot works as a government analyst, having earned a PhD in history from Temple University. He wrote his dissertation on the American Civil War, namely the experiences and contributions of Union soldiers who entered the Army of the Potomac in time to serve during the Overland Campaign. This project assessed the motivations, behavior, and combat performance of troops who filled the ranks left empty by veterans with expiring three-year terms. Dr. Caillot is revising his dissertation for publication as a book. He has had articles published by the *U.S. Military History Review*, Modern War Institute, and The Strategy Bridge, in addition to authoring over twenty scholarly book reviews featured in print and online.



Notes

1. Quotes throughout this article do not include italicized or underlined words to ensure clarity. Ethan Bisbee, "Lyman E. Knapp (1837–1904) Papers, 1862–1887," finding aid, Sep 2000, Lyman E. Knapp (1837–1904) Papers, 1862–1887, MSA 189:15, Vermont Historical Society, Barre, VT; Lyman E. Knapp, "1887 speech of 28 pages given by Lyman Knapp at a Vermont Memorial Day service," Lyman E. Knapp (1837–1904) Papers, 1862–1887, MSA 189:16, Vermont Historical Society (quote 1); Joel H. Lucia, "Seventeenth Regiment," in *Revised Roster of Vermont Volunteers and Lists of Vermonters Who Served in the Army and Navy of the United States during the War of the Rebellion*, 1861–66, comp. Theodore S. Peck (Newport, VT: Civil War Enterprises, 1892; repr. 1996), 575; Leander Otis Merriam, "Personal Recollections of the War for the Union," 76, Coll. S-5186, Maine Historical Society, Portland, ME (quote 2).

2. Allan Nevins, ed. *A Diary of Battle: The Personal Journals of Colonel Charles S. Wainwright, 1861–1865* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962), 530. The author calculated the total of 820,000 using information from Eugene C. Murdock, *One Million Men: The Civil War Draft in the North* (Madison, WI: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1971), 344; Gregory J. W. Urwin, "'The Lord Has Not Forsaken Me and I Won't Forsake Him': Religion in Frederick Steele's Union Army, 1863–1864," *Arkansas Historical Quarterly* 52, no. 3 (Autumn 1993): 320, https://doi.org/10.2307/40030853. Historiographic references to later arrivals are numerous and the following is but an abbreviated listing. For the soldier's experience, see Bell Irvin Wiley, *The Life of Billy Yank: The Common Soldier of the Union* (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1952), 345; Earl J. Hess, *The Union Soldier in Battle: Enduring the Ordeal of Combat* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997), 90. For the campaigns, see Gordon C. Rhea, *The Battle of the Wilderness, May 5–6, 1864* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994), 34–35, 436; Steven E. Sodergren, *The Army of the Potomac in the Overland and Petersburg Campaigns: Union Soldiers and Trench Warfare, 1864–1865* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2017), 226. For mobilization, see Judith Lee Hallock, "The Role of the Community in Civil War Desertion," *Civil War History* 29, no. 2 (Jun 1983): 124–26; James W. Geary, *We Need Men: The Union Draft in the Civil War* (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1991), 13–15, 113, 157, 161. For war narratives, see James M. McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 720; Russell F. Weigley, *A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 1861–1865* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 323; Stephen W. Sears, *Lincoln's Lieutenants: The High Command of the Army of the Potomac* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017), 623–24; A. Wilson Greene, *A Campaign of Giants—The Battle for Petersburg*, vol. 1, *From the Crossing of the James to the Crater* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2018), 13–14.

3. As of 12 June 1864, the other units serving in the 2d Brigade included the veteran 2d Maryland, and the 6th, 9th, and 11th Regiments, New Hampshire Volunteer Infantries. The brigade also contained another later arrival outfit, the 32d Maine Volunteer Infantry Regiment. U.S. War Department, ed., *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 70 vols. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1880–1901), 1:36:1, 132, 148, 162, 176 (hereinafter *OR*), http://collections.library.cornell.edu/moa_new/waro.html; "The Seventeenth Regiment," *Rutland Weekly Herald*, 30 Jun 1864, (quote 1); Lucia, "Seventeenth Regiment," 569, 570, 572–73; (untitled), *Bangor Daily Whig and Courier*, 2 May 1864; William E. S. Whitman and Charles H. True, *Maine in the War for the Union: A History of the Part Borne by Maine Troops in the Suppression of the American Rebellion* (Lewiston, ME: Nelson Dingley Jr., 1865, 581; Ltr, John Parris Sheahan to father, 21 Jun 1864, John Parris Sheahan Papers, 1862–1865, Coll. 184, Maine Historical Society, Portland, ME (quote 2); Henry C. Houston, *The Thirty-Second Maine Regiment of Infantry Volunteers: An Historical Sketch* (Portland, ME: Press of Southworth Brothers, 1903), 71, https://archive.org/details/thirtysecondmain00hous. To calculate the percentage of Vermonters with prior military service and the number of casualties they sustained, the author created a spreadsheet to tabulate all the officers and soldiers who served in the regiment. This document is hereinafter abbreviated as 17th VS. To compensate for incomplete records, the author cross-checked the following sources to produce as accurate a final accounting as possible: Peck, *Revised Roster*, 575–97; Fold3, Ancestry, www.fold3.com/; Enlistment Contracts, Companies A-D (A-L), F26082; Companies D (M-Z)-G (A-McGrath), F26083; Companies G (Mansfield-Z)-K (A-Shaw), F26084; Company K (Smith-Z), Enlistment Contracts of Colonel F. V. Randall, F26085; all in 17th Regiment, Vermont Volunteer Infantry, microfilm, Records of the Adjutant and Inspector General/Civil War Series, Vermont State Archives and Records Administration, Middlesex, VT; Bisbee, "Lyman E. Knapp," MSA 189:15; Ethan Bisbee, "Matthew and Moses Whitehill Letters, 1859-1878," finding aid, Jun 2009, Matthew and Moses Whitehill Letters, 1859–1878, MSA 520, Vermont Historical Society, Barre, VT; "John L. Yale (1841–19), Civil War Papers, 1862–1920," finding aid, undated, Papers of John L. Yale, 1863–1920, Silver Special Collections Library, University of Vermont, Burlington, VT; enlistment contract, Papers of John L. Yale; (RG) 94, Records of the Adjutant General's Office, Entry 114, Civil War Regimental Books, 17th Vermont (Volunteer) Infantry, Descriptive Book, National Archives Building, Washington, DC (hereinafter NAB); RG 94, Records of the Adjutant General's Office, Entry 115, Civil War Regimental Books, 17th Vermont (Volunteer) Infantry, Regimental Consolidated Morning Report and Order Book, NAB (hereinafter abbreviated as 17th Vermont, Morning Report and Order Book). In cases of conflicting information, the author deferred to the *Revised Roster*. Likewise, the author created a spreadsheet that tabulates all the officers and soldiers who served in the 31st, a document hereinafter abbreviated as 31st MS. The consulted sources included John S. Hodsdon, *Appendix D of the Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Maine, for the Years 1864 and 1865* (Augusta, ME: Stevens & Sayward, 1866), 733–67; Record Group 94, Records of the Adjutant General's Office, Entry 114: Civil War Regimental Books, 31st Maine (Volunteer) Infantry, Descriptive Book, Companies A to F, and Descriptive Book, Companies G to M, NAB; Record Group 15: Department of Defense, Veterans, and Emergency Management, Office of the Adjutant General, 1753–1971, Civil War–Regimental Records, 1861–1865, 31st Maine Infantry Records, 1861–1865, Container 321200, Enlistment Papers, 1864, Maine State Archives, Augusta, ME; Bill Thayer, "Thomas Hight," Class of 1853, Bill Thayer's Web Site, https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/Places/America/United_States/Army/USMA/Cullums_Register/1587*.html, last updated 17 February 2013.

4. William Marvel, *Tarnished Victory: Finishing Lincoln's War* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011), 74–75; Earl J. Hess, *In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications and Confederate Defeat* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 280; Hess, Union Soldier in Battle, 66.

5. Charles Royster, *A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American Character, 1775–1783* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 25; Earl J. Hess, *Liberty, Virtue, and Progress: Northerners and Their War for the Union*, 2nd ed. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997), viii–ix; Ricardo A. Herrera, *For Liberty and the Republic: The American Soldier, 1775–1861* (New York: New York University Press, 2015), 163; James M. McPherson, *For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 16.

6. *OR* 1:36:1, 22–23, 25, 235; Adam Badeau, *Military History of Ulysses S. Grant, from April, 1861, to April, 1865* (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1882), vol. 2, 341, https://archive.org/details/grantmilitaryhisto02badeuoft/mode/2up (quote).

7. Lucia, "Seventeenth Regiment," 570; *OR* 1:36:1, 253; *OR* 1:36:3, 749 (quote 1); *OR* 1:40:1, 52–22, 568; Frank S. Ritter, "A Drummer Boy's Service in the Ranks," in *History of the Ninth Regiment New Hampshire Volunteers in the War of the Rebellion*, ed. Edward O. Lord (Concord, NH: Republican Press Association, 1895), 420, https://archive.org/details/historyofninthre00lord; Newell T. Dutton, "The Camp on the James River," in Lord, *Ninth Regiment*, 428; Ltr, Charles Cummings to wife, 15 Jun 1864, transcription, Charles Cummings Papers, 1857–1873, MSA 28:9 (quote 2); Ltr, Charles Cummings to wife, 18 Jun 1864, Charles Cummings Papers, 1857–1873, MSA 28:7; both in Vermont Historical Society, Barre, VT; Diary, Henry O. Perry, 14–15 Jun 1864, Henry O. Perry Diaries, 1864 Jan–1866 Apr, MS 2187, New York Historical Society, New York, NY; Leander W. Cogswell, *A History of the Eleventh New Hampshire Volunteer Infantry in the Rebellion War, 1861–1865* (Concord: Republican Press Association, Railroad Square, 1891), 472, https://archive.org/details/historyofelevent91cogs; Houston, *Thirty-Second Maine*, 254–56; Horace Porter, *Campaigning with Grant* (New York: Century Co., 1906), 197, https://archive.org/details/campaigningwith01portgoog; Theodore L. Lyman, "Operations of the Army of the Potomac, June 5–15, 1864," in *Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts*, vol. 5, *Petersburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg*, comp. Military Historical Society of Massachusetts (Wilmington, NC: Broadfoot Publishing Company, 1906, repr. 1989), 23; Merriam, "Personal Recollections," 47; Diary, Eldin J. Hartshorn, 15 Jun 1864, Civil War diary of Eldin J. Hartshorn, 1864, MSC 209:17A, Vermont Historical Society, Barre, VT; Tom Ledoux and Associates, "Civil War Diary of Franklin Temple Carter, Private, Company G," Vermont in the Civil War, https://vermontcivilwar.org/units/17/frankcarter.php, last modified 9 January 2002.

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16. Ltr, Cummings to wife, 11 Jul 1864, MSA 28:9 (quote 1); *OR* 1:40:1, 522 (quote 2), 545; Merriam, "Personal Recollections," 49–50 (quote 3); Houston, *Thirty-Second Maine*, 276, 280; Ledoux and Associates, "Civil War Diary of Franklin Temple Carter"; Diary, Perry, 17 June 1864; Ltr, Cummings to wife, 18 Jun 1864, MSA 28:7; Ltr, Sheahan to father, 18 Jun 1864; Ltr, King to wife, 22 Jun 1864; Cogswell, *Eleventh New Hampshire*, 377; Humphreys, *Virginia Campaign*, 218.

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19. *OR* 1:40:1, 531, 545, 569; *OR* 1:40:2, 157; Cogswell, *Eleventh New Hampshire*, 377; Lucia, "Seventeenth Regiment," 571; *Bangor Daily Whig and Courier*, 25 Jun 1864; Ltr, Smith to unknown recipient, 18 Jun 1864; Woodbury, *Burnside and the Ninth Army Corps*, 410.

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ARMY HISTORY

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Army History welcomes articles, essays, and commentaries of between 4,000 and 12,000 words on any topic relating to the history of the U.S. Army or to wars and conflicts in which the U.S. Army participated or by which it was substantially influenced. The Army's history extends to the present day, and *Army History* seeks accounts of the Army's actions in ongoing conflicts as well as those of earlier years. The bulletin particularly seeks writing that presents new approaches to historical issues. It encourages readers to submit responses to essays or commentaries that have appeared in its pages and to present cogent arguments on any question (controversial or otherwise) relating to the history of the Army. Such contributions need not be lengthy. Essays and commentaries should be annotated with endnotes, which should be embedded, to indicate the sources relied on to support factual assertions. A manuscript, preferably in Microsoft Word format, should be submitted as an attachment to an email sent to the managing editor at usarmy.mcnair.cmh.mbx.army-history@mail.mil.

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MUSEUM FEATURE

The 82d Airborne Division War Memorial Museum

By John W. Aarsen

The museum exterior as viewed from the parking lot.

The 82d Airborne Division War Memorial Museum was established in 1945 while the 82d Airborne Division was on occupation duty in Berlin after World War II. Its mission is to collect, preserve, exhibit, and interpret the division's history from 1917 to the present. Its primary purpose is to educate the military and civilian communities about the division's history.

The museum began as a room in Berlin during occupation duty. In January 1946, it arrived in New York and moved to Fort Bragg (now Fort Liberty), North Carolina, with the division. It was in a small, wooden former company headquarters building in the old division area. In 1957, the 82d Airborne Division Historical Society opened the first purpose-built museum in the Army and the museum has been in this location ever since. The society has made three major additions to the building to include more exhibit, theater, and archive space. The exhibit gallery was refurbished in 2016 to incorporate the 82d Airborne Division's most recent deployments. However, visitors can still find the story of the division's service in World War I and its airborne assaults of World War II. A highlight from the gallery is Sgt. Alvin York's uniform. The 82d's no-notice deployment mission means the museum has artifacts and exhibits from Operation Allies Refuge, which include weapons the Afghan National Army abandoned. The 82d's units used these abandoned weapons during the mission to secure Hamid Karzai International Airport.

The museum site includes a 7-acre airpark and memorial garden. The airpark contains five planes that the 82d Airborne Division used for parachuting. The memorial garden includes commemorations to the division's combat and training deaths from its beginning to the present day.

The 82d Museum offers a variety of educational programs, professional development training, and tours for military and civilian groups. These programs help visitors understand the legacy of the 82d Airborne Division and the young people that have made this history since 1917. The museum also has a small archive that is available by appointment for researchers and soldiers to use.

John W. Aarsen is the director at the 82d Airborne Division War Memorial Museum. He has worked for the Army Museum Enterprise for over twenty-five years. He was the team lead that opened the Airborne and Special Operations Museum in Fayetteville, North Carolina, in 2000. As an Army Reservist, he deployed as a historian—in 1998 to Bosnia and from 2001 to 2002 to Afghanistan and Iraq.

The 82d Division Memorial honors over 5,500 war dead.

A soldier leaves a rose at 82d Airborne Division Preparing for Combat Memorial.

World War II Gallery with Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin and 1st Sgt. Leonard A. Funk Jr. exhibit

Cold War Gallery with Dominican Republic Exhibit and M274 Mule in the foreground

World War II Gallery with Battle of the Bulge exhibit

Panama and DESERT STORM Exhibit Gallery, with General (then major general) Carl W. Stiner's jeep in the foreground

Royal Thai Airborne commander and troopers visiting the museum

The museum's airpark featuring the Curtiss C–46 Commando and Douglas C–47 Skytrain aircraft

The Seal of Muhammad:

A Symbol of Faith, Jihad, and the Return of the Islamic Caliphate

By James Bartlinski

On 23 March 2019, the Pentagon declared the territorial defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), following a hard-fought battle by a U.S.-led global coalition to take the Syrian town of Baghuz and the surrounding region. Coalition participants included the Syrian Democratic Forces and other local partners.

At the time, the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) estimated that the victory liberated approximately 7.7 million Syrians from ISIS oppression.

In July 2019, four months after the defeat of ISIS, Leila Mustafa, cochair of the Raqqa Civil Council (Syria), presented the commanding general of the XVIII Airborne Corps and Combined Joint Task Force–Inherent Resolve, Lt. Gen. Paul J. LaCamera, with an ISIS signet ring taken from a captured jihadist fighter during the Baghuz campaign. General LaCamera received the ring in a small ornate box along with an ISIS caliphate-minted coin known as a Golden Dinar.

Since antiquity, people have worn signet rings, which are also known as seal rings. Signet rings consist of an embossed or engraved design on the bezel (the top section of a ring), such as a coat of arms, a symbol, or a word or phrase. The wearer uses the ring to close and authenticate documents by pressing its engraved design into wax.

The ring appears to refer to Muhammad (570–632 CE), the Prophet of Islam, based on the "Seal of Muhammad" inscription on the bezel. In Arabic, the ring's text reads, from right to left and top to bottom, "Muhammad is the messenger of Allah." The phrase is part of the testimony of faith; the first pillar of the five pillars of Islam. According to certain fundamentalist views in Islam, it is said that Muhammad used his ring to seal the wax on letters he wrote to foreign heads of state. His ring is significant because the phrase "Allah" or "God" appears on the bezel. Muslims considered the name sacred and thus it serves as a testament to the wearer's faith. The Seal of Muhammad often appears on a black backdrop, as seen on the ISIS flag and other items (such as the ring given to General LaCamera) now in the Airborne and Special Operations Museum collection.

ISIS and its affiliates adopted this symbol in 2007. The text appears on its flags, rings, and other mementos to show membership or support for the jihadist organization. These mass-produced rings (some of dubious quality) are among the various accoutrements acquired by jihadist militants to demonstrate their dedication to the cause.

According to hadith (a collection of traditions comprising Muhammad's sayings), the Prophet's battle standard was a solid black flag, imparting on those fighting under the banner a sanctity to their mission of fighting Islam's enemies. The color black and the use of the Seal of Muhammad on various items such as flags and rings in today's Islamist extremist movement are designed to lend historical and religious validity to its cause. As a result, the color black and the Seal of Muhammad on signet rings reflect the wearer's devotion to God, as well as their obligation to carry out jihad against infidels and restore the Islamic Caliphate.

The ongoing objective of defeating ISIS and its affiliates in Iraq, Syria, the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, and elsewhere remains a key priority of the national defense strategy of the United States and its allies. The mission in Syria, in partnership with the Syrian Democratic Forces, continues the fight to secure the permanent defeat of the terrorist organization there.

James Bartlinski is the director of the Fort Liberty Museums.


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

"Our Job is to Restore Law and Order"

The 175th Military Police Battalion in Kansas City, 1968

National Guard soldiers protect a Kansas City Police car.
(*Missouri State Archives*)

By Ned C. Holt

On 4 April 1968, James Earl Ray assassinated Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in Memphis, Tennessee. His death, along with the racial tensions plaguing America, triggered riots and disturbances in 125 cities across the United States. City and state governments throughout the country employed various measures to deal with the protests, riots, and disturbances. Over 52,000 armed forces members assisted state officials in restoring order; this included over 18,000 National Guard and 34,000 Regular Army soldiers.[1]

Kansas City was the only city in Missouri that required outside assistance to deal with the disturbances. At the height of the riots in Kansas City, approximately 3,100 members of the Missouri Army National Guard (MOARNG) and 200 members of the Missouri State Highway Patrol were working in Kansas City.[2] Unlike its counterparts in other cities across America, the Missouri Guard handled itself well, and prominent members of the Kansas City African American community lauded its performance during those crucial days.[3]

Although racial tensions were far from optimal in Kansas City, it initially seemed like the city would dodge the riots afflicting other towns. From the day Dr. King was assassinated (Thursday, 4 April) until his funeral and a National Day of Mourning (Tuesday, 9 April), there were no riot-related arrests, curfews, or mass protests in Kansas City. On Sunday, 7 April (Palm Sunday), there was a peaceful march of over 50,000 in Kansas City to "grieve the death of (Dr.) King and to pray for reconciliation." Many city and religious leaders began to think that "Kansas City is different," and that it would not be affected. However, Kansas City's period of relative calm changed on 9 April when, for an unknown reason, the city kept open its public schools during Dr. King's funeral.[4] It did not take long for events to spiral out of control, leaving the police unable to control the streets of Kansas City. The mayor's final report on civil disorder deemed the failure to close the city's public schools as the "primary cause" for the riots.[5] Nearby cities, such as Kansas City, Kansas, and districts across the state in St. Louis, Springfield, and Columbia, closed schools, and they had no rioting.[6]

Missouri Governor Warren E. Hearnes (*left*) in discussion over lunch with the 175th Military Police Battalion commander, Lt. Col. Leslie M. Grenier (*right*).
(*Missouri State Archives*)

The distinctive unit insignia of the 175th Military Police Battalion
(*The Institute of Heraldry*)

Capability Gaps Exposed in the National Guard's Ability to Respond to Domestic Disturbances

Public demonstrations protesting racial inequality and the United States' involvement in the Vietnam War drew large crowds, which often turned violent in the late 1960s. Local and national leaders frequently called on the Regular Army and National Guard to restore order during these events. This exposed problems with both forces. Vietnam War and Cold War requirements took much of the Regular Army's training time, money, and resources. The U.S. Army Reserve Forces could not fully appreciate the problems associated with riot duty on domestic soil.[7]

The Army designed the Reserve's and Guard's riot control training for use in a foreign country, not for use on citizens of the United States.[8] Race riots in the summer of 1967 hit the cities of Detroit, Michigan, and Newark, New Jersey, particularly hard. The National Guard and Regular Army helped city officials restore order in both towns. Yet the National Guard's performance was heavy-handed, disjointed, and widely criticized in those riots. They were a wake-up call to America's civil and military leaders that the National Guard was not ready to handle race riots.[9]

Preparing the National Guard for Domestic Disturbances

In the late summer and fall of 1967, the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee held a series of meetings on civil unrest and the military's ability to respond to a domestic crisis. These hearings addressed the root causes and came up with solutions, which immediately affected the Guard's structure, organization, and training. They noted the persistent racism in society, the lack of African American members of the National Guard, and outdated training methods. Moreover, the National Guard did not have the proper equipment for domestic disturbances.[10]

The committee's final report directly affected every unit in the National Guard. The committee directed them to update their plans for domestic disturbances and to perform "mandatory civil disturbance training for all Army National Guard units." [11] In September 1967, the Missouri Guard submitted a draft plan to the National Guard Bureau and began to conduct the required training. The plan was quite detailed and it directed units to conduct training on "civil disturbances, military leadership, responsibilities, and discipline, . . . riot control agents and munitions, . . . [and] dealing with sniping, looting, and the protection of firefighters."[12]

From the fall of 1967 until April 1968, units in the Missouri Guard trained almost exclusively on responding to a disturbance in the United States. Simultaneously, the civilian and uniformed leadership of the Missouri Guard met regularly with the leaders of the National Guard Bureau, Regular Army, and local and state police forces to devise plans for citywide disturbances.[13] Key recommendations included conducting joint civilian police–military patrols and withholding arrest privileges from military police officers over civilians.[14] The Guard also would have to acquire body armor, nonlethal armaments, and tactical communication equipment that worked in an urban environment.[15]

During the review of the state's emergency preparedness plan, the Missouri Guard began to direct a series of changes to how the units operated to ensure they were ready to respond quickly and effectively to a crisis. The changes improved the state's emergency management capability and the unit's equipment and training. At the state level, there was the staffing and organization of the state's Emergency Operations Headquarters (EOH), which would later play a significant role in running the National Guard's mission in Kansas City. The tactical changes included ordering riot control equipment (body armor, shotguns, armored personnel carriers, and nonlethal riot control gear) and directing that all units in the state guard begin to train.[16] The state's quartermaster spent the next ten months acquiring all of the equipment identified as being necessary for riot duty. As a result, the Missouri Guard had a well-developed plan, proper gear, rules of engagement articulating arrest procedures, and command relationships that worked well after a few hiccups in the first twenty-four hours.[17]

The 175th Military Police Battalion

One of the units at the heart of Missouri's response to the riot was the 175th Military Police (MP) Battalion (BN). The 175th was an Army National Guard unit from mostly rural towns in the center and northeastern parts of the state. Other than conducting occupation duties in West Germany from 1950 to 1954, the Army had not activated the 175th to respond to any disasters until the death of Dr. King.[18] After returning from West Germany, the unit resumed its status as a traditional National Guard unit.

In the spring of 1968, the 175th MP BN headquarters was in Fulton and consisted of four subordinate units: A Company in Columbia, B Company in Warrenton, C Company in Boonville and Moberly, and D Company in Hannibal. Companies A, B, C, and D each were authorized 155 soldiers, and the headquarters detachment had 62 soldiers, giving the 175th MP BN a total of 682 personnel.[19] In the six months preceding the riots, the 175th's average present and

Kansas City

Thursday 4 April

Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. assassinated.

MOARNG: State Emergency Operations Headquarters (EOH), all units in the Kansas City (K.C.) area on Alert Level II.
Police: Conduct practice alert.
City: No citywide actions.
K.C. Public Schools: Open.
State Police: Nothing to report.

Friday 5 April



Saturday 6 April

MOARNG: All units conduct riot training, K.C. and St. Louis riot task forces on Alert Level II.
Police: Nothing to report.
City: No citywide actions.
K.C. Public Schools: Closed for the weekend.
State Police: Nothing to report.

Sunday 7 April

MOARNG: All units conduct riot training.
Police: Nothing to report.
City: No citywide actions.
K.C. Public Schools: Closed for the weekend.
State Police: Nothing to report.

Monday 8 April

MOARNG: Nothing to report.
Police: Nothing to report.
City: No citywide actions.
K.C. Public Schools: Open.
State Police: Nothing to report.

Saturday 13 April

MOARNG: Approximately 2,900 soldiers on riot duty.
175 MP BN: Gov. Warren E. Hearnes visits unit at East High School; conducts joint patrols with the K.C. Police.
Police: Three reports of arson; ninety-nine reports of riot-related arrests. Level II alert in place.
City: First day of no curfew.
K.C. Public Schools: Closed for the weekend.
State Police: 197 officers on riot duty.

Easter Sunday 14 April

MOARNG: Strike Force (quick reaction) stands down at 12:30 a.m. Decision made to demobilize all units except the 175 MP BN.
175 MP BN: Just past midnight, a soldier on guard duty shoots one round at a car circling the unit's location.
Police: Strike Force (quick reaction) stands down at 12:30 a.m. No reports of arson. Seventy riot-related arrests.
City: No curfew.
K.C. Public Schools: Closed for the weekend.
State Police: 117 officers on riot duty.

Monday 15 April

MOARNG: All units demobilized, and TF ALPHA and the EOH deactivated.
175 MP BN: The 175th moves from the East High School building to U.S. Naval Reserve Training Center Brush Creek at 8:30 a.m. and conducts joint patrols with the K.C. Police.
Police: Six reports of arson.
City: No curfew.
K.C. Public Schools: Closed.
State Police: 117 officers on riot duty.

April 1968

Tuesday 9 April
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s Funeral

MOARNG: Riot team task forces alerted; EOH moves from Jefferson City to K.C. Approximately 1,480 soldiers on riot duty.
Police: Level II alert in place (twelve-hour shifts, all officers on duty); 42 reports of arson; 203 riot-related arrests; K.C. Police shoot nine citizens and kill one. Eight police officers and one firefighter injured. Unknown assailants wound thirteen civilians.
City: Citywide curfew 10 p.m.–6 a.m.
K.C. Public Schools: Open.
State Police: 175 officers on riot duty.

Wednesday 10 April

MOARNG: Two soldiers injured. Soldiers shoot two civilians. 2,140 soldiers on riot duty.
175 MP BN: Alerted, activated, and begins deployment; advance party departs for K.C.
Police: K.C. Police shoot 6 citizens, and kill three. One police officer and 1 firefighter injured. Unknown assailants wound nine civilians. Reports of arson peak at 46; 178 riot-related arrests. Level II alert in place.
City: Citywide curfew 9 p.m.–6 a.m.
K.C. Public Schools: Closed.
State Police: 199 officers on riot duty.

Thursday 11 April

MOARNG: 2,900 soldiers on riot duty. City leadership decides to de-escalate tensions during daylight hours to prepare for night duty.
175 MP BN: Arrives East High School at 8 a.m.; begins first patrols at 5 p.m.
Police: Zero civilian deaths, one police officer and one firefighter injured. An unknown assailant wounds one civilian. Two reports of arson; 147 riot-related arrests. Level II alert in place.
City: Citywide curfew 7 p.m.–6 a.m. The city prohibits all gas sales in bottles/cans, and orders all businesses selling firearms and ammunition closed. Taverns and liquor stores must close by 7 p.m.
K.C. Public Schools: Closed at 9:15 a.m., students sent home.
State Police: 209 officers on riot duty.

Good Friday 12 April

MOARNG: Approximately 2,900 soldiers on riot duty.
175 MP BN: Conducts joint patrols with K.C. Police.
Police: Five reports of arson; 223 riot-related arrests. Six police officers injured. Level II alert in place.
City: Citywide curfew 7 p.m.–6 a.m.
K.C. Public Schools: Closed.
State Police: 209 officers on riot duty.

Tuesday 16 April

MOARNG: Nothing to report.
175 MP BN: Transitions to stand-by duty; still mobilized.
Police: One account of riot-related arson.
City: No curfew.
K.C. Public Schools: First full day open.
State Police: Released from riot duty.

Wednesday 17 April

MOARNG: Nothing to report.
175 MP BN: Released by 5 p.m., convoys home.
Police: Two reports of riot-related arson.
City: No curfew.
K.C. Public Schools: Open.
State Police: No one on riot duty.

Missouri State Archives

National Guard soldiers arrest and search suspected rioters.
(*Missouri State Archives*)

fit-for-duty numbers hovered around 640 soldiers. During this period, ten to fifteen soldiers were entering or leaving the service, coming from or going to training, absent due to injury or illness, or absent without leave. The 175th's personnel status was stable in the year preceding the riots, with an aggregate monthly personnel turnover that fluctuated between 1–2 percent.[20]

A Company was in the process of a reorganization directed by the National Guard Bureau that began in January 1968 and was to be completed by 1 May 1968. After the transformation, A Company would be located in Kansas City. Its members would transfer from the 923d Engineer Company (Dump Truck). The 864th Medical Company (Ambulance), which was in Kansas City, and the former members of A Company would remain in Columbia. The unit in Columbia would become a part of the 1st Battalion, 128th Artillery.[21] When the riots broke out, the transfer had yet to occur, leaving all of the leaders, personnel, and equipment in place, but the unit was in a state of flux, as it was just a month shy of its planned conversion.

The battalion's two top leaders changed in January 1968 when Lt. Col. Leslie M. Grenier took over as the commander of the 175th and Maj. Colin Campbell became the executive officer. In addition to these changes, Capt. Arthur Bradley became the new C Company commander in January 1968, and 1st Lt. Kenneth R. Cowder assumed command of D Company in February 1968. When the riots broke out, most of the 175th's midlevel and senior leaders had been in the unit for several years.[22]

Over 95 percent of the 175th consisted of traditional National Guard members (with duty once a month), and each company employed two to three full-time technicians, clerks, and sergeants to answer phones, repair the unit's equipment, and prepare for the next month's training. The bulk of the soldiers in the 175th (around 84 percent) were military police officers, and the remaining 16 percent were a mix of cooks, mechanics, communication specialists, and supply personnel. Soldiers assigned to the 175th carried the World War II–era M1 rifle and used the M151 jeep to conduct patrols.

In 1967, the Missouri Guard started to integrate its ranks with African American soldiers. By the end of year, less than 1 percent of the total force was African American. The bulk of these soldiers was in two units located in Kansas City.[23] In April 1968, there were no African Americans or women in the 175th. A lack of women was not abnormal for the time. At the start of the riots, there was only one woman in the Missouri Guard, 1st Lt. Dolores J. Carl. She was a registered nurse from Kansas City who was activated during the riots and received significant newspaper attention for her unique distinction.[24]

The 175th sent 640 citizen-soldiers (approximately 20 percent of the Missouri Guard activated) to the streets of Kansas City for seven days and helped return the city to a semblance of normalcy. In the execution of this mission, they did not injure civilians and fired only a single warning shot at a vehicle approaching their bivouac area.[25] Looking back, it is remarkable that a unit that was 100 percent White and rural patrolled an area that was overwhelmingly urban and Black without injuring anyone or committing any overt acts of aggression. Throughout the riots, members of the Missouri National Guard shot three civilians, all of whom survived. Every injury caused by a Missouri Guard shooting occurred on the tumultuous first day of the Guard's activation on 10 April 1968. There were warning shots fired on subsequent days, but none resulted in a casualty.[26] Considering the hectic circumstances, the Guard handled itself well.

This does not mean that there was not racism in the Missouri Guard in 1968. Some interviews (and official reports) are dripping with racism, hatred, and contempt for African Americans. What is telling about the National Guard's performance is how they overcame these problems through training, discipline, and engaged leadership at all levels. The National Guard knew that having clearly defined roles and responsibilities, easy to understand rules of engagement, and engaged leadership would enable uniformed military to patrol its own streets with a minimum of casualties. By all observable standards, the Guard performed much better than the Kansas City Police Force.[27]

4–8 April 1968 (Thursday–Monday): The Lead Up to the Riots

When Ray murdered Dr. King on 4 April 1968 (Thursday), there was little protesting or rioting in Kansas City, and therefore no reason to activate the National Guard. As a precautionary move, the Kansas City Police and Missouri Guard placed their elements on heightened alert status on Friday, and the Guard directed more riot control training for all of its units.[28]

Over the weekend of 6–7 April 1968, the 175th MP BN trained at their home stations exclusively on riot control procedures. The headquarters detachment in Fulton sent out various staff and command elements to inspect the subordinate companies in the unit. B Company in Warrenton conducted a practice alert. C Company in Boonville and Moberly held a companywide bivouac at the Moberly armory, which included a convoy from Boonville to Moberly. D Company in

Lena Rivers Smith protests in front of a police line outside City Hall.
(*University of Missouri, Kansas City*)

Hannibal had their riot control training inspected by the battalion commander and sergeant major, Colonel Grenier, and Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Robert W. Terrell, along with a representative from the Fifth United States Army, the Regular Army unit responsible for overseeing their training.[29] The *Hannibal Courier* interviewed the commander of D Company. Lieutenant Cowder stated that his unit "had conducted over sixteen hours of riot control training at the Admiral Coontz Armory over Saturday and Sunday and that 150 members of the unit attended the training."[30] The front page of the *Moberly Monitor-Index* ran an article about the unit conducting riot control training over the past weekend and stated that the unit was on alert status.[31]

9 April (Tuesday): Dr. King's Funeral and the Activation of the MOARNG

Tuesday, 9 April, was a National Day of Mourning and the day of Dr. King's funeral. It was a fateful day for Kansas City. The day began with a march on city hall by African American students protesting the failure of the city to close the public schools. Early into the protest, there was some violence and vandalism. This violence and the riots in other areas of the country caused the mayor to request National Guard forces for Kansas City. The initial mobilization order only affected units in the Kansas City area and the EOH in Jefferson City, which accounted for approximately 18 percent of the Missouri Guard's total force.[32] There were still concerns that a disturbance would occur in the St. Louis area, and the state's leadership wanted the task force responsible for the St. Louis region to remain in place.[33]

The first twenty-four hours of the activation and mobilization of the Missouri Guard did not go well. The process was halting and a bit rigid, relying on a peacetime mentality which the realities of riot duty in an American city quickly overwhelmed. Commanders and planners failed to anticipate how a disturbance in an urban environment would affect the ability of soldiers to report to their mobilization sites. With many roads blocked and communication at a minimum, they could not distribute centrally stored riot equipment to the armories in the middle of the crisis. Almost all riot gear arrived late, putting soldiers on the streets without flak vests, nonlethal weapons, or improved communication equipment. Because of the chaos of the riots, preplanned and approved rules of engagement were not followed in the first hours of the Guard's activation. A plan to use the trucks and buses from the Army Reserve units in the Kansas City area was not put into motion.[34]

The units in Kansas City experienced trouble contacting their soldiers, getting them to the respective armories, and preparing them for riot duty. First Sgt. George Callwell, the senior enlisted soldier in Company B, 110th Engineer Battalion, described a scene of organized chaos. Callwell's unit was at ground zero, and his soldiers were in a hostile situation the minute they left their armory at 3620 Main Street in Kansas City. He discussed how the rules of engagement were being "made up as we went along." The preferred types of ammunition (shotguns and nonlethal CS gas) were unavailable, and the Army did not resupply the soldiers' fundamental

Rev. Edward L. Warner falls on the ground and police surround him.
(*University of Missouri, Kansas City*)

life-support issues (food and water) for the first twenty-four hours.[35]

Relevant government agencies established a joint force headquarters at the Scottish Rite Building on Linwood Boulevard. This area became the city's epicenter of the state's response to the riots. In addition to the combined headquarters, each element (city, state, police, and Guard) set up its base in the area. On the first day of the riots, commands often stepped into each other's areas of responsibility, and they lost opportunities to bring a quick and less violent end to the riots.[36]

10–11 April (Wednesday–Thursday): The 175th is Called to Duty

By Wednesday morning, it became evident that the city needed additional forces to regain control. Conducting operations around the clock was taxing the ability of the police and military to control the streets of Kansas City. Planners had underestimated what it took to operate headquarters, guard shifts, and patrols twenty-four hours a day.[37] Sheer exhaustion began to hit most of the soldiers. Fatigue, compounded by the uncertain nature of patrolling an American city, only added to the overall anxiety and tension of the situation.

Unlike the units in the city, the more rural 175th was able to stick to its plan and depart for Kansas City on time with only minor adjustments. Pvt. Ron Holbrook, serving in C Company at Moberly, reflected on how shocking it was to see his unit's name on television as one of the units going to Kansas City.[38] At the armory, the soldiers received their tactical gear and weapons, mounted heavy machine guns on the unit's jeeps, and gathered instructions on their mission and rules of engagement.[39]

Before the main body moved out, the 175th sent out its advance party at 0045 on 11 April. This advance party consisted of the battalion's supply officer, Capt. Joe D. Holt; personnel officer, 1st Lt. Vern D. H. Bohling; and their liaison to the EOH in Kansas City, 1st Lt. John A. Duncan. Their job was to secure billeting, food, fuel, and guidance from their higher headquarters. They arrived in Kansas City at approximately 0330 and saw a city wholly deserted, minus law enforcement and other soldiers.[40]



The 175th movement plan called for a linkup at Cosmopolitan Park in Columbia, Missouri, where they would receive last-minute supplies and their mission brief, and then move together over 100 miles on Interstate 70 to Kansas City. Representatives from the state armory in Jefferson City met them there with ammunition.[41] Once on the road, the 175th's movement from Columbia to Kansas City looked like a significant response. The convoy stretched over a mile long; there were State Highway Patrol vehicles in the front and back, along with twenty-five to thirty jeeps with .30- and .50-caliber machine guns mounted on them. As formidable as the convoy looked, C Company commander Capt. James K. Womack told his soldiers, "our job is to restore law and order, not to hurt anyone."[42]

Once the 175th arrived in Kansas City, it went to its bivouac area at East High School on Van Brunt Boulevard. The unit established guard posts and defensive positions around the school and then bedded down for rest and prepared for a busy day. Private Holbrook recalled that there were no bunks, and everyone just slept on the floor of the gym in sleeping bags for the first day.[43] The unit's supply officer spent the following days securing food and gas from local grocery stores and gas stations. He described a haunting scene, with no one on the streets but stores full of goods.[44]

Later that morning, the battalion's leaders went to the state command post where they learned their mission areas and the rules of engagement. The 175th was to conduct joint patrols with the Kansas City Police in some of the challenging neighborhoods, which consisted of "9th Street to the north, Charlotte on the west, Benton on the east, and the Kansas City Terminal Railroad tracks on the south."[45] This large area of operations, along with the state's and city's desire to take back the city, forced the 175th to commit all of its assets to the riot immediately. The 175th adopted a mission schedule of "two up, two down," meaning every available military police officer was either on duty or resting and preparing to return on duty. This left

A National Guard jeep on the streets of Kansas City. Note the mounted .30-caliber machine gun.
(*Missouri State Archives*)

the unit with no capable reserve force to call upon if something should go wrong.[46]

Wednesday was by far the most challenging day for the 175th. They had driven all night, set up camp in an unfamiliar place, and were out on the streets patrolling some of the hardest-hit areas with police officers they had just met. Capt. Arthur Bradley, the A Company commander from Columbia, said the first night of duty "was pretty rough." However, they strictly adhered to the rules of engagement and, as a result, fired only a few rounds.[47] By the time the 175th reported for duty, there was already an established procedure for conducting patrols. The units on duty would go to the riot headquarters, receive a daily briefing and missions, link up with their police counterpart, and depart for twelve hours of patrolling or static guard duty. To defuse tensions in the city and return to preplanned civil-military policing, 175th MP BN police officers began patrolling in police cars instead of jeeps and armored personnel carriers. The Army placed armored personnel carriers at key choke points and around the riot control headquarters. The standard police officer-to-soldier ratio was 1:3. Clarence Gibson, a Kansas City police officer in 1968, said, "this show of force kinda carried the day . . . something was intimidating when you walk up with your gun in your holster, and three guys are behind you [carrying M1s]."[48]

Committing the 175th was risky, but they were the only unit readily available. Other units in the St. Louis area were on hold status to respond to issues that might arise there.[49] However risky, it proved to be a decisive point in the riots. Two days after the 175th arrived, the daily number of riot-related arrests had dropped from 178 to 99, and reports of arsons had fallen from 46 to 3. Based on these numbers and other indicators, city officials decided to ease the curfews and lift restrictions on the sale of firearms, ammunition, and liquor, and would fully reopen all Kansas City public schools the following week.

12–14 April (Friday–Sunday): Garrisoned at East High School

Friday and Saturday were relatively uneventful days for a heavily militarized Kansas City. Riot-related arrests, reports of arson, sniping, and all related activities dropped from highs on Tuesday and Wednesday to negligible levels. On Friday, planning by the city, police, and Guard was already underway to reduce the size and scope of their contingents. Before they made a decision, all relevant city, state, and Guard organizations wanted three days of calm before downsizing. The situation on



National Guard jeeps lined up outside East High School.
(*Missouri State Archives*)

Two National Guard soldiers patrol the streets of Kansas City.
(*Missouri State Archives*)


175TH MP BN RIOT CONTROL
KANSAS CITY, MO
10–18 April 1968
175th Area of Operations
Highest Riot Activity
0
1 Mile
0
1 Kilometer
9th St
City Hall
Police HQ
Oak St
Union Station
Charlotte St
Benton Blvd
East High School
Mount St. Mary's Cemetery
Woodland Ave
27th St
Union Cemetery
Spring Valley Park
Scottish Rite
Indiana Ave
45th St
Brush Creek Blvd
U.S. Naval Reserve
35
71
40
70
50

National Guard troops climb into the back of a Kansas City Police car at the Emergency Operations Headquarters at the Scottish Rite building.
(*Missouri State Archives*)

the streets was still dangerous, with large numbers of soldiers and police officers patrolling or guarding critical infrastructure and road junctures. However, this was the initial sign of a return to normal. Both state and local leaders began to plan for future de-escalation.[50] The D Company Commander, First Lt. Kenneth R. Crowder, noted that the mood on the streets had changed from "hostile to friendly" on Friday.[51] Friday was the last curfew day; initially set for 1900, city leaders amended the order to allow citizens to remain on the streets until 2300.[52]

By Saturday, conditions in Kansas City began to calm significantly. Riot-related arrests remained on a downward trend, but at any given time, there were still 1,000 Guard soldiers, 460 city police, and 75 State Highway Patrol officers on the streets.[53] After seeing riot numbers decline for three days, city and state leaders decided late Saturday night to downsize the police and military presence on the streets. They would slowly de-escalate the increased police and army presence in Kansas City through a phased withdrawal. This phased approach started by standing down the Emergency Operations Headquarters, for the Kansas City police to return to regular staffing, for the State Highway Patrol to do the same, and for the National Guard to demobilize all units, minus the 175th MP BN over the next days. At 0030 Sunday, both the Guard and city police quick reaction units were deactivated, and they returned to their home units. Around 1030, the Guard ordered all of the units on riot duty, minus the 175th MP BN, to return to their armories and demobilize. This decision released 2,200 soldiers from active duty. In addition to the Guard's downsizing, the State Police Task Force dropped from 180 to 117 and transitioned back to eight-hour shifts. On Sunday, the city police stopped collecting riot-related arrest data as they saw the end of the active riot phase, even though there were still five more reports of arson over the next three days.[54] The police also went back to their preriot eight-hour shifts.[55] By 1800 Sunday, every unit, minus the 175th, had turned in its weapons and equipment and was no longer on duty.[56]

National Guard soldiers search a civilian vehicle.
(*Missouri State Archives*)

After all other National Guard units left Kansas City, the 175th patrolled a more extensive area but scaled back the number of patrols to allow the city to respond. This order meant the 175th was acting in standby mode to ensure no return to rioting. In a phone interview, C Company commander Captain Womack said that his soldiers "have done a really good job and should be on standby tonight, and they are in good shape."[57] The A Company 1st Sgt. William C. Price said, "The unit was easing its support of civilian police today and should be on standby duty tonight." He also said, "things have been fairly quiet since we've been here."[58]

16–18 April (Monday–Wednesday): Move to Brush Creek, Reduce Patrols, Demobilize

On Sunday, the city decided to open all public schools on Tuesday, which meant the 175th would have to vacate East High School. The 175th left their encampment at East High School early Monday morning and bivouacked at the U.S. Naval Reserve Brush Creek Armory on Brush Creek

National Guard troops stand watch over a fire hydrant and a Kansas City firefighter.
(*Missouri State Archives*)

Cots lined up in the gym at East High School where the 175th MP BN was garrisoned.
(*Missouri State Archives*)

National Guard soldiers check for looters during the riots.
(*Missouri State Archives*)

Boulevard. State Guard leaders directed the 175th to reduce its patrols further, and they transitioned to eight-hour shifts.[59]

By Tuesday, Kansas City had all but returned to a preriot state. All public schools were back in session, there had not been a curfew for three days, arson reports were down to preriot levels, and state assets returned to their preriot status. That afternoon, the city released the State Highway Patrol, and the 175th received orders to return the following morning. Captain Womack said that the unit did not conduct any patrols on Tuesday and just observed Lincoln School's reopening and confirmed that there "was no trouble" in the (former) riot areas.[60] After limited patrolling and observing Tuesday, the 175th packed up and prepared to leave the following morning. Early Wednesday morning, 17 April 1968, the last National Guard unit on duty drove home, and by the evening, every unit was back at their armory.

A convoy of National Guard vehicles lined up preparing to depart.
(*Missouri State Archives*)

In summary, in the 1960s, protests against racial inequality and the Vietnam War were tearing America apart from within. The summer riots of 1967 in Newark, New Jersey, and Detroit, Michigan, were a wake-up call to America that the National Guard was ill-prepared to handle domestic disturbances. In response, the Guard devised a consolidated and integrated approach to the issues identified. It changed its training program from foreign threats to domestic disturbances and coordinated with local police and civilian authorities to think through the nuances of operating on American soil.

As a result of this re-missioning of the reserve forces, the Missouri Army National Guard and the 175th MP BN were ready to alert, marshal, quickly deploy, and operate in a complex environment on domestic soil. Before the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in 1968, the Guard had almost a year of training on riot duty, developed rules of engagement with state and local officials, created a state-level command and control structure to deal with riots, and acquired the necessary equipment to assist in the mission. This preparation paid off when the time came; the Guard was well prepared, trained, and equipped, and had a headquarters unit to quickly employ its elements. Overall, the 175th handled itself well on those crucial days. The 175th MP BN and the MOARNG helped a city return to normalcy while treating its citizens with dignity and respect.

Col. Ned C. Holt is an active duty logistics officer and is currently the commander of the 10th Sustainment Group at Torii Station, Okinawa. He has served twenty-nine years in both the Regular Army (twenty-five years) and Louisiana Army National Guard (four years). He was born and raised in Fulton, Missouri. Colonel Holt has published articles on the use of international agreements to facilitate cooperation between nations and how to effectively employ division rear command posts in large scale combat operations.

His military deployments include Hurricane Andrew recovery with the Louisiana Army National Guard in 1992, to Bosnia for Stabilization Force 11 in 2002, to Mosul, Iraq, for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM III in 2004–2005, to Camp Morehead, Afghanistan, for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM–A, in 2010–2011, and to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, for Special Operations Joint Task Force–Operation INHERENT RESOLVE in 2017.

He has attended every level of professional military education, including serving as a U.S. Army War College Fellow with the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in Canberra, Australia. He earned a Bachelor of Arts in History and Political Science from the Louisiana State University at Baton Rouge in 1994, and a Master of Arts in Diplomacy and Military Studies from Hawai'i Pacific University in Honolulu in 2003. Ned is a certified military historian and strategist.

A column of National Guard soldiers marches down the sidewalk
(*University of Missouri, Kansas City*)

A police line outside of City Hall.
(*University of Missouri, Kansas City*)

Notes

1. Paul J. Scheips, *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disturbances, 1945–1992*, Army Historical Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2005), 272.

2. Chief, National Guard Bureau (NGB), *Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1969*, 82, https://www.nationalguard.mil/About-the-Guard/Historical-Publications/Annual-Reports/; Scheips, *The Role of Federal Military Forces*, 272.

3. David R. Hardy, Robert P. Ingram, Arthur Mag et al., *Final Report: Mayor's Commission on Civil Disorder, August 15, 1968*, *Kansas City, Missouri,* 72–74, https://www.mow.uscourts.gov/sites/mow/files/2022-DBB-Mayor-Comm-Civil-Disorder-081568.pdf; Rpt, Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department, 15 Aug 1968, sub: Riot Report April 9–16, 1968, File 17–67A, Annex 70, Kansas City Police Archives, Kansas City, MO; David Karrigan Fly, "An Episcopal Priest's Reflections on the Kansas City Riot of 1968," *Missouri Historical Review* 100, no. 2 (Jan 2006): 108–09; Missouri National Guard Public Affairs, *The Missouri Guardsman*, Jun 1968, 39. Former Missouri State Representative Harold Holliday Sr. and Berwyn Fisher, both well-known African American civil rights leaders in Missouri, commented on how well the Missouri Army National Guard treated the citizens of Kansas City during the riots.

4. Fly, "An Episcopal Priest's Reflections," 106–7.

5. Hardy, Ingram, Mag, et al., *Final Report: Mayor's Commission*, 34; Joel P. Rhodes, "It Finally Happened Here: The 1968 Riot in Kansas City, Missouri," *Missouri Historical Review*, 91, no. 3 (Apr 1997): 297–98.

6. Hardy, Ingram, Mag, et al., *Final Report: Mayor's Commission*, 34–35.

7. Barrye L. Price, "The Role of Federal Troops in Quelling Civil Disturbance in Washington, D.C., April 1968," (master's thesis, Texas A & M, May 1994), 1–16, 30–32, 36, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA270505.pdf.

8. Scheips, *The Role of Federal Military Forces*, 200–204.

9. Ibid., 218–19.

10. Ibid., 209–22; Price, "The Role of Federal Troops," 18–19; The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, *The Kerner Report* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), 279–80.

11. Scheips, *The Role of Federal Military Forces,* 218; Memo, F. Edward Hebert, Chairman, Special Subcommittee for all State Adjutants General, n.d., sub: Hearings Conducted by the House Armed Services Committee on the Capability of the National Guard to Cope with Local Disorders, Missouri State Archives; Memo, F. Edward Herbert for all units in the MOARNG, 14 Aug 1967, sub: Domestic Disturbances and Riot Control Training, Missouri State Archives.

12. Scheips, *The Role of Federal Military Forces*, 218–19.

13. Ltr, Col. Lewis H. Conley, Ch of Staff, Missouri Army National Guard (MOARNG), to H. W. Johnson, Secretary-Treasurer, Missouri Peace Officers Association, 8 Feb 1968, n.s., Missouri State Archives.

14. Memo, Maj. Gen. L. B. Adams, for Ch, NGB, 27 Aug 1967, sub: Command Relationship Between State Military Forces and Civil Law Enforcement Agencies at All Levels, Missouri State Archives.

15. Memo, Maj. Gen. L.B. Adams, for Ch, NGB, 29 Aug 1967, sub: State Security Equipment, Missouri State Archives; Memo, Brig. Gen. Charles L. Southward, Asst. Ch, NGB, for the Adjutant Generals of Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas and Wisconsin, n.d., sub: Special Equipment for Civil Disturbance Operations, Missouri State Archives.

16. Memo, Maj. Gen. L. B. Adams for Ch, NGB, 29 Aug 1967, sub: State Security Equipment, Missouri State Archives; Memo, State of Missouri Adjutant General, for Ch, NGB, 15 Aug 1967, sub: Adjutant General's Duty Officer and Unit Contact, Missouri State Archives; MOARNG Training Dir, 14 Aug 1967, sub: Domestic Disturbances and Riot Control Training, Missouri State Archives.

17. Rpt, Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department, Riot Report, 9–16 Apr 1968, Missouri State Archives 72; AAR, State Emergency Duty, 9–17 April 1968, Kansas City, MO, Emergency Operations Headquarters, MOARNG, Jefferson City, MO, 20 May 1968, Missouri State Archives; Memo, Col. James M. Blue, Dep Cdr, MOARNG, for Maj. Gen. L. B. Adams, Adjutant General of Missouri, 6 May 1968, sub: Reference Lessons Learned from Recent Riots from the State Emergency Operations Headquarters, Missouri State Archives; Mtg min, State of Missouri, Adjutant General's Office, AG Special Staff Meeting, 30 Apr 1968, Missouri State Archives.

18. Citation, Department of the Army, Lineage, and Honors, 175th Military Police Battalion (MP BN), 13 Feb 1969, Missouri State Archives.

19. Companies A, B, C, and D of the 175th MP BN were mission-oriented; 98 percent of the soldiers in these units are MP soldiers.

20. Daily Rpts, Companies A, B, C, D, of the 175th MP BN and Headquarters, Headquarters Detachment (HHD), Jan–Apr 1968, Missouri State Archives.

21. Memo, NGB, for the Adjutant General State of Missouri, 5 Jan 1968, sub: Reorganization of the Army National Guard, Authority Number 1-68, Reorganization of the Army National Guard, Missouri State Archives.

22. Intervs, author with Fred Baysinger, 27 Mar 2010; Joe Holt, 15 Mar 2010; Ronnie Hughes 3 Apr 2010; all members of the 175 MP BN who participated in the riot deployment, author's files.

23. Henry Clay Gold, "Few Negroes in Guard," *Kansas City Star*, 7 Jan 1968. There were ten African American officers and eighty-one African American enlisted soldiers out of 11,317 personnel in the MOARNG at the end of 1967. All of these soldiers were in the 146th Engineer Battalion and the 923d Engineer Company, both of which were in Kansas City, MO.

24. "Beauty on Duty," *Hannibal Courier Post*, 12 Apr 1968.

25. Appendix, "Injuries and Death," to Rpt, Kansas City MO Police Department, n.d. sub: Riot Report April 9–16, 1968, 12–16, File 17-67A, Missouri State Archives; Daily Rpts, 175th MP BN Companies, 9–17 Apr 1968, Missouri State Archives; MMR, Kansas City Riot Control Rpt, 175th MP BN, 22 Apr 1968, Missouri State Archives.

26. Appendix "Injuries and Death," to Rpt, Kansas City MO Police Department, n.d., 12–16.

27. Hardy, Ingram, Mag, et al., *Final Report: Mayor's Commission*, 36–37; Appendix "Assistance by Missouri National Guard," to Rpt, Kansas City, MO Police Department, n.d.; *The Missouri Guardsman*, Apr 1968.

28. Daily Rpts, Companies HHD, A, B, C, and D, 175th MP BN, 6–7 Apr 1968, Missouri State Archives; Rpt, Kansas City, MO Police Department, n.d. 52–53.

29. Daily Rpts, Companies HHD, A, B, C, and D, 175th MP BN, 6–7 Apr 1968, Missouri State Archives.

30. "Local Guard Unit Conducts Riot Control Training," *Hannibal Courier*, 8 Apr 1968, 1.

31. "Guard Unit Here on Alert Status," *Moberly Monitor-Index*, 8 Apr 1968, 1.

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39. Interv, author with Baysinger, 27 Mar 2020; Interv, author with Hughes, 3 Apr 2010; Interv, Viewssman with Holbrook, 23 May 2002.

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

BODIES FOR BATTLE: US ARMY PHYSICAL CULTURE AND SYSTEMATIC TRAINING, 1885–1957

By Garrett Gatzemeyer

University Press of Kansas, 2021
Pp. viii, 329. $39.95

Review by Kendall Cosley

In April 2022, the U.S. Army revised its Army Combat Fitness Test (ACFT), an assessment of soldiers' health and fitness, to reflect better the varying levels of physical capabilities rather than a one-size-fits-all approach. The new iteration of the ACFT accounted for age and gender-normed scoring tables, replaced the leg tuck requirement, and added an alternative event to running: a 2.5-mile walk. These test amendments alluded to questions of how the Army trains its soldiers, for what purposes, and to what ends. Though current issues, they are not new concerns for the Army, as posited by Garrett Gatzemeyer in *Bodies for Battle: US Army Physical Culture and Systematic Training, 1885–1957.*

Gatzemeyer uncovers the origin and evolution of the Army's physical culture, which he "define[s] as a constellation of ideas about the nature and value of fitness, and of the means by which one should achieve it" (2). To do so, he examines thinkers, educators, and policymakers between 1885 and 1957 who ultimately shaped the various stages of this culture. Gatzemeyer grounds his assessment on societal pressures, such as masculinity, morality, and readiness, causing the Army to reflect on whom to train and the best ways to prepare civilians for military service.

For Gatzemeyer, the Army formulated its physical culture in three phases. The first started in 1885 at the hands of Herman J. Koehler. Fears of male degeneration in American society worried Army leaders over the masculinity of their soldiers. Koehler, an instructor at the U.S. Military Academy, sought to squelch the crisis by establishing a physical training system and educating instructors. He encouraged activities that promoted discipline, such as gymnastics, bayonet fighting, and field training exercises. Koehler published his methods in two books, produced in 1892 and 1904, to advertise his ideas. The Army acknowledged Koehler's efforts by publishing the *Manual of Physical Training for Use in the United States Army* in 1914, solidifying a systematic training program for the first time. By the eve of World War I, Koehler had formed a physical culture that understood the importance of psychological needs in addition to physicality, strengthened unit capabilities over individual ones, utilized expert knowledge, and assumed high-quality recruits would need refinement.

A consistent theme throughout the book is how major changes in the Army's physical culture resulted from times of emergency. The advent of World War I ushered in the second phase by Joseph E. Raycroft. The war brought new and unready conscripts into the force who needed more training than Koehler's mere refinement. The author asserts that Raycroft's approach displaced Koehler from 1917 to 1920. Raycroft and his team of civilian elites created a Commission on Training Camp Activities to train new recruits. Unlike Koehler, Raycroft promoted the individual warrior over the unit. He also encouraged sports to help with combat skills and established a school system for physical training instruction. Though concerned with combat effectiveness, the Army also aligned its education with progressive societal pressures to build moral soldiers who would return to civilian life and revitalize American society. Raycroft's vision came to fruition with his 1920 *Mass Physical Training for Use in the Army and the Reserve Officers' Training Corps*. The physical culture in this period had resulted from a time of emergency when the Army shifted its mission to forming moral and masculine men and encouraged the views of educators.

The third phase, once again born in a time of crisis, came in 1942 with the rise of the scientific measurement school. World War II saw another increase in new recruits who needed to be trained. Field Manual 21–20, published in 1941, focused on quickly turning recruits into efficient soldiers by increasing disciplinary exercises, building more obstacle courses, teaching swimming and life-saving measures, and conducting physical efficiency tests. In addition to the new manual, Training Circular 87, published in 1942, emphasized the need for healthy bodies rid of disease and defect by encouraging fitness instructors to craft strong, agile, and coordinated bodies that endured on a fast-moving battlefield. As Gatzemeyer asserts, the key feature of World War II physical culture combined athletics with systematic training. Sports and drills became integral for fitness, discipline, and morale within the Army. This period raised questions regarding whose bodies needed training as women entered the Women's Army Corps. Training transformed men into soldiers, causing a problem of how to produce fit and capable women without

turning them into soldiers. To fix the issue, the definition of fitness changed for women, emphasizing endurance, flexibility, and a put-together appearance rather than combat readiness.

Although these three periods produced movers and shakers who drove changes to the physical culture, the periods between major wars revealed much of the Army's concerns for the fitness of their men and future warfare. After World War I, Army leaders reflected on the high rejection rate of conscripts, which they linked to a lack of physical culture in the civilian sphere. The Army shifted to "prehabilitation" to prepare civilians for future conflict as evidenced by the creation of the Citizens' Military Training Camp. The camp's goal was to develop strong and capable young men through military training and prepare them for potential service. Similarly, the Civilian Conservation Corps, a Great Depression measure, became a "man-building agency" that taught young men skills, fostered desirable behaviors, and sculpted their bodies. After World War II, the Army once again tried to institute "prehabilitation" with Universal Military Training, the Victory Corps, and the President's Council on Youth Fitness. Gatzemeyer raises meaningful questions on the definition of citizenship as the Army sought to mold civilians into fit men ripe for the Army.

Bodies for Battle impressively covers almost seven decades of the Army's development of its physical culture, which Gatzemeyer explains the Army had forged by 1957, premised on individual fitness, rooted in empirical research, and oriented toward preparation for infantry combat (193). He ends his analysis in 1957, claiming the twin manuals produced that year demonstrated that the Army had officially accepted the need for systematic physical training. Gatzemeyer eloquently weaves in social concerns and the philosophies that drove national policies. He never loses sight of the interconnectedness of the Army and American society, both of which fed off the needs and concerns of the other.

Though *Bodies for Battle* conveys a compelling origin story of the Army's systematic training program, Gatzemeyer's turning points sometimes get buried in the overlapping periodization of his chapters. For instance, he discusses the 1914 training manual, pivotal in establishing a formal physical culture, in Chapters 2 (which covers the period of 1885–1916) and 3 (1914–1920) and is glossed over in both chapters. His analysis also fails to mention any concerns of race, which was a point of contention for the Army in both world wars for African American troops.

Gatzemeyer's biggest contribution is his attention to the Army's influence in shaping men, soldiers, and citizens through their service training programs and with civilian programs. The Army during this period became "a vehicle for moral, mental, and physical uplift," which reverberated into American society (216). His analysis causes us to revisit our concerns over Army readiness and what it means to be an American citizen.

Kendall Cosley is a U.S. Army Fellow with the U.S. Army Center of Military History. She is also a PhD candidate at Texas A&M University. Her dissertation focuses on war correspondents and infantry soldiers who created the persona of the American G.I. during World War II. She has an essay in the edited volume *Reporting World War II,* published in 2023 by Fordham University Press.



THE CONTEST FOR LIBERTY: MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN THE CONTINENTAL army, 1775–1783

By Seanegan P. Sculley

Westholme, 2019
Pp. xxxiv, 206. $30

Review by Joshua S. Freeman

Seanegan P. Scully's timely study of military leadership during the American War of Independence fills a much needed gap in the historiography of the war. It contributes significantly to our understanding of the uniquely American factors that influenced the development and evolution of the Continental Army. As an active-duty Army officer with a wealth of experience, he brings a unique perspective to this subject, adding great value to his argument. His well-researched, organized, and reasoned examination is broken into five key components of leadership and military organization: officership, recruiting, the use of discipline, training, and morale. He examines the development and evolution of each component throughout the Continental Army's existence.

Scully traces the historical development of military leadership in the American colonies and rightly argues that various ways of thinking about and organizing for military service developed in different areas of the colonies before 1775. These divergent traditions emerged because of the unique factors that influenced the development of each American colony. These military establishments changed throughout the colonial period as various threats to their security emerged or faded. The most significant impact on these military establishments occurred due to the French and Indian War (1754–1760), and the North American theatre of the global Seven Years' War (1756–1763). For the first time in the history of Britain's North American colonies, each colony would be engaged militarily in the conflict. Tens of thousands of Americans would participate in military service in various roles and this experience profoundly affected them. Although Scully highlights the influence of this conflict on the colonial military establishments and points out specific examples of some Americans' service in the previous war, his overall contention regarding "institutional knowledge" is "that there was little continuity between the Seven Years' War and the Revolution" (xxix).

Although institutional knowledge is difficult to assess in new organizations, most historians agree that the experiences

of those serving in the French and Indian War, and the conflict's political and social outcomes, shaped the coming of the Revolution. As Fred Anderson notes, for thousands of Americans who served during the war, "the experience of service with the regulars left enduring marks on the provincials, and not only on those who left the army with marks on their backs." Anderson points out that "in New England . . . between 40–60 percent of the men in the prime military age would pass through the provincial forces," and they were "young men whose influence on society would grow more palpable . . . the impact of their wartime experiences might be felt for years after their discharge."[1] It was not a coincidence that the Revolution began in New England or that the British were met with such effective military resistance outside Boston in 1775. Many Americans learned significantly from their experiences serving alongside British Regulars. They learned how to be a soldier and that the British were not invincible. Disasters such as Braddock's Defeat convinced them that British leadership was fallible and that they could defeat the Redcoats.

One American who learned significantly from his prior service was George Washington. Scully illustrates at length the efforts Washington and his senior commanders made to strike a balance in this new American Army between disparate understandings of effective military leadership and the Republican ideology at the center of the Revolution. Although Washington and many of his senior officers had views of military leadership centered on their own cultural and societal conceptions and personal experiences, often from the British Army, many of the officers Washington encountered as he took command of the Continental Army in the summer of 1775 did not quite meet these expectations. Most European armies of the period had officer corps made up almost entirely of men from the aristocracy or the gentry; most American company and field grade officers throughout the war came squarely from the middle classes. These officers, especially those from New England, had different ideas than Washington about how to lead their men effectively. These differences are understandable, given the divergent cultural and social norms in various parts of America. Washington spent considerable effort struggling to impart his views of military leadership to his officers, and as Scully effectively illustrates, Washington never quite got there. What eventually emerged was a hybrid system that blended components of various leadership philosophies in regionally aligned units. As commander in chief, Washington would have to balance these various components and understandings of effective military leadership throughout the war, juggling the subordination, good order, and discipline necessary in military forces with Republican ideology.

Scully argues that the soldiers in this new American Army were different from their European counterparts in both station and agency and thus required a different style of effective military leadership. These "Republican" soldiers were not automatons who would adhere to orders without thinking and they required negotiation and mutual understanding between themselves and their officers to be led effectively. Scully's research and analysis effectively demonstrate that this phenomenon was certainly in place in the Continental Army, but his argument identifies this as a uniquely American experience. Soldiers who had expectations of their leaders and who engage in an ongoing dialogue about those expectations in both formal and informal ways were perhaps rare, especially about European norms of the period. However, this American experiment required novel ideas and systems that continually evolved to meet the ever-changing requirements of a burgeoning institution. To be led effectively, soldiers of a Republic required enlightened leadership. In 1796, reflecting on the soldiers of another new republic, a 26-year-old general in command of his first army found that "A general's most important talent is to know the mind of the soldier and gain his confidence . . . He is not a machine that must be made to move, he is a reasonable being who needs leadership."[2]

Some major themes of Scully's thesis are debatable, such as the influence of the previous war and the emergence of a uniquely American military leadership style. He also does not explore in depth the substantial impact of foreign (especially French) officers on the development of leadership in the Army. This rather short but quite deep work could also have benefited from a greater substantial comparative analysis of European armies of the period. That being said, Scully's in-depth examination of the recruiting, discipline, training and morale of the Continental Army is a significant contribution to the scholarship of the period and serves to rank this book alongside such eminent works as James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Lender's *A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic, 1763–1789* (Harlan Davidson, 1982) and the U.S. Army Center of Military History's own *The Continental Army* (1983) by Robert K. Wright Jr. as a must-read to understand the evolutionary structure and development of this first American Army. As we approach the 250th anniversary of the American Revolution, it is encouraging to see such timely and appropriate works to aid our understanding of that most formative experience.

Joshua S. Freeman is a historian with the Field and International History Programs Division of the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He received his master's degree in military history from Norwich University and specializes in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century American military history.

NOTES

1. Fred Anderson, *The Crucible of War: The Seven Years War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754–1766* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 287–88.

2. Jean-Antoine Chaptal, *Mes Souvenirs de Napoléon* (Paris: E. Plon, Nourit et Cie, 1893), 296.



SMALL BUT IMPORTANT RIOTS: THE CAVALRY BATTLES OF ALDIE, MIDDLEBURG, AND UPPERVILLE

By Robert F. O'Neill Jr.

Potomac Books, 2023
Pp. ix, 319. $36.95

Review by Arnold Blumberg

More than thirty years in preparation, *Small but Important Riots: The Cavalry Battles of Aldie, Middleburg, and Upperville,* by Robert F. O'Neill Jr., fills in for the first time, in the greatest detail, the day-by-day story of the mounted fighting that took place in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia just nine days before the Battle of Gettysburg during the summer of 1863.

The titanic struggle between the Union Army of the Potomac and the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia fought over the fields, woods, and ridges near the small town of Gettysburg, the county seat of Adams County, Pennsylvania. This culminated General Robert E. Lee's second invasion of the North, arguably the American Civil War's most crucial military campaign. For the first time in the war in the East, this operation witnessed consecutive days of mounted duels between Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart's Confederate cavaliers and the plucky troops of the Army of the Potomac for cavalry superiority. Over the years, the better-known mounted engagements, such as the Second Battle of Brandy Station (9 June 1863), the largest cavalry battle ever fought on North American soil, the fight on East Cavalry Field (3 July 1863) and the rearguard actions of five weeks later as General Lee's army struggled to recross the Potomac River to Virginia, have had much ink expended on their recounting. With O'Neill's new study, the lesser-known cavalry actions proceeding the Battle of Gettysburg at Aldie, Middleburg, and Upperville now have their excellent stand-alone study by the foremost authority on those mounted fights.

Robert F. O'Neill is a graduate of American University. He served as a peace officer in the Commonwealth of Virginia for over thirty years before moving to Montana. During his stay in the Big Sky Country, he served in law enforcement again. Returning to Virginia, he became an instructor at a state police academy.

In 1993, O'Neill's *The Cavalry Battles of Aldie, Middleburg, and Upperville, June 10–27, 1863* was published by H. E. Howard. At the time, it was rightly touted as the last word regarding the subject it dealt with. In 1997, he wrote a scholarly monograph entitled *What Men We Have Got are Good Soldiers and Brave Ones Too: Federal Cavalry Operations in the Peninsula Campaign*, published by Savas Publishing Company as part of their Peninsula Campaign of 1862 series. This was followed by *Chasing Jeb Stuart and John Mosby: The Union Cavalry in Northern Virginia from Second Manassas to Gettysburg*, in 2012 by McFarland and Company.

Steeped in a thorough knowledge of his subject because of his unparalleled diligence as a researcher and decades of investigating at the National Archives and depositories around the country, his extensive contacts with other scholars in the field, and his numerous investigative walking tours of the ground upon which the battles of Aldie, Middleburg, and Upperville took place makes O'Neill the preeminent authority on the topic.

The readers of this review should not think of O'Neill's most recent treatment of the fights at Aldie, Middleburg, and Upperville as a mere repetition of his book published in 1993. On the contrary, this current volume supplies much newly discovered archival material. For example, the author brings new light to the activities and character of significant players such as Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton, the commanding general of the Cavalry Corps, Army of the Potomac, and Col. Alfred N. Duffie, the leader of the ill-fated First Rhode Island Volunteer Cavalry Regiment.

Unlike the author's initial effort, his extensive revised study of the Aldie, Middleburg, and Upperville actions include appendices regarding orders of battle, battle casualties for both the U.S. Army and Confederates, and even material on horses, ordnance, and regimental strength. In addition, the maps have been redone for the new study and lend great assistance to the narrative. Speaking of the narrative, O'Neill has crafted his book with outstanding writing and organizational skill, so much so that as the reader turns each page, he or she will experience the depth of the characters, almost hear the crack of a revolver and carbine fire, the boom of artillery, and the gallop of enemy horse soldiers resulting in the inevitable ring of steel meeting steel in mounted melees.

The publisher purposely omitted about 10,000 words of the original text during the editing process. Still, those who pick up O'Neill's new work need not worry about the material that fell victim to the editor's scissors. All the left-out material in question can be found on O'Neill's highly informative American Civil War cavalry blog: https://smallbutimportantriots.com. This material is worthy of chapters and appendices of their own and adds significantly to the published book's content.

The twenty-four chapters, which comprise the body of *Small but Important Riots,* reveal the grit, determination, perseverance, and leadership of the enlisted soldiers and officers. They fought for four days of continual cavalry action, which broke out at times into furious forays and then subsided to scattered, sporadic scuffles at and near Aldie, Middleburg, and Upperville, Virginia, in mid-June 1863. In addition, the mistakes made by some of the commanders of both the Federal and Rebel mounted forces are unabashedly presented.

Finally, as a tactical (i.e., brigade, regiment, squadron, and company) rendition of Civil War cavalry combat, the main goal of the book, *Small but Important Riots: The Cavalry Battles of Aldie, Middleburg, and Upperville,* has few peers. This is an excellent book and a most welcome work for any Civil War enthusiast and cavalry buff.

Arnold Blumberg is an attorney residing in Baltimore, Maryland, and

the author of *When Washington Burned: A Pictorial History of the War of 1812* (Casemate Publications, 2012). He also regularly contributes to numerous military history journals and magazines. He is a former Visiting Scholar with the Johns Hopkins University history department and a Fellow by Invitation with the classics department at the same institution.



MEN OF ARMOR: THE HISTORY OF B COMPANY, 756TH TANK BATTALION IN WORLD WAR II—PART ONE: BEGINNINGS, NORTH AFRICA, AND ITALY

By Jeff Danby

Casemate Publishers, 2021
Pp. xviii, 369. $34.95

Review by Westin E. Robeson

Men of Armor: The History of B Company, 756th Tank Battalion in World War II, is a fast-reading, well-balanced history of tankers during World War II. Theodore Roosevelt, President of the American Historical Association in 1912, charged historians to have "the power to embody ghosts, to put flesh and blood on dry bones, to make dead men living . . . to take the science of history and turn it into literature."[1] Indeed, author Jeff Danby hits these marks in part one of *Men of Armor*. This multivolume endeavor has received high accolades, including the Army Historical Foundation's Distinguished Writing Award for unit history in 2021.

The author anchors the first volume of *Men of Armor* to Charles M. Wilkinson, who will ultimately command Company B of the 756th General Headquarters (GHQ) tank battalion. Danby introduces the reader to Wilkinson, a graduating second lieutenant from Texas A&M's Reserve Officer Training Corps' 1940 class. He was ordered promptly to Fort Knox, where he reported to the Division Officers Training Center (DOTC). Danby concisely narrates the history of American armor up to that point, reviewing the familiar 1st Provisional Tank Brigade, Col. Adna R. Chaffee, early light tanks, Col. Daniel Van Voorhis, the mechanization of the 7th Cavalry Brigade, and the ambiguous mission of the Armored Force. After six weeks at the DOTC, Wilkinson hoped to land a position in one of the new armored divisions but learned he and his cadre would form the nucleus of one of the five new GHQ tank battalions. He started for Fort Lewis in Washington State to join the 756th Light Tank Battalion.

Fort Lewis was home to numerous armor, infantry, artillery, and cavalry units within the Fourth Army's IX Corps. With the dewy forests and brick barracks of Fort Lewis providing the backdrop, Danby describes the role of the GHQ tank battalions and their machines, which at the time consisted of a few M1 and M2 light tanks. Obsolete though they were, these machines proved a scarce commodity in the rapidly sprouting training facilities across the country. Having only six of these tanks, the 756th had to make do with BB guns and small wooden frames representing the back-ordered tanks. To on-looking infantry units, tank crews lumbering around with wooden frames in hand was comedic. As for the tankers, they "gained valuable and practical experience rehearsing roles, crew communication, and platoon and company coordination tactics" (29).

In the early chapters, Danby delivers a straightforward yet fascinating narrative of garrison life for tankers moving from California camps to Camp Pickett, Virginia. Here, Company B welcomed the new sleek M5 light tanks. Danby recounts the tankers' curiosity about the M5's armor, as evidenced by an unauthorized experiment where a lieutenant ordered a company cook to fire a truck-mounted .50-caliber machine gun at one of the tanks. The battalion commander could not help but follow up his reprimand of the lieutenant with his own curiosity: "Did the rounds penetrate?" (67). The early chapters follow Wilkinson as he navigates emerging training programs, new machinery, and various personalities on his way to becoming the commanding officer of Company B.

Chapters 5 through 8 follow the battalion as it itches for combat across North Africa. If the first chapters of the book present garrison life, the middle chapters capture the curiosities, burdens, amusements, and duties of life in a bivouac. His descriptions of tank maintenance, recreational barbecues, security activity, personnel rotation, sleeping conditions, road marches, and other minutiae give vivid insights often absent from most histories.

In North Africa, the 756th constantly prepared for a fight that always escaped them. However, battalion officers, including Captain Wilkinson, were sent to Tunisia to observe the 751st Tank Battalion, then worked with the 34th Infantry Division to secure the Fondouk Pass. For the first time, Wilkinson encountered the noise of combat, the silent wreckage, and the ugliness of death. Scorched medium M3s and charred, mangled bodies left a humbling impression on the young commander, who knew he would eventually be tasked with leading his tankers into battle.

Wilkinson returned to his regiment with knowledge gained: commanders do not "button up" their hatches and must depend on their exposed eyes to identify threats; all crewmembers must be savvy with compasses, maps, and nighttime navigation; high explosive ricochet fire was more effective than direct hits; continue hitting enemy tanks until they burn; the best officers lead from the front. Shortly after his return to the battalion, Wilkinson was promoted temporarily to battalion S–3. His fortuitous appointment found him in the presence of the port commander at Bizerte Harbor, who reported that two LSTs (Landing Ship, Tanks) were ready to transport available reinforcements to the newly established beachhead at Salerno, Italy. Taking advantage of his current rank, Wilkinson volunteered the 756th for action, and the battalion was soon loaded onto the LSTs.

Chapters 9 through 15 delve into the battalion's combat experiences. For the remainder of 1943, the tank companies were divided among Army and Corps headquarters to provide security, often in the form of

creating roadblocks. The tankers correctly assumed that their peripheral function was because of being a light battalion. Everything changed on 15 December with Fifth Army's General Orders 107, calling for the unit to transform into a medium battalion. Within three days, Company B had swapped out all of its M5s for medium M4s. For the rest of the month, crews familiarized themselves with their new machines, working with R–975 engines, azimuth dials, and the much more powerful 75-mm. cannon.

After the New Year, the 756th was attached to the 34th Infantry Division and tasked with driving through the Mignano Gap toward Cassino and the Gustav Line. Their sector was a 2-mile stretch along the Rapido River, just north of Cassino. On the western side of the river, the Germans had established a solid defensive network, utilizing two imposing hills and an Italian barracks complex. Dozens of machine gun emplacements with prepared fields of fire, surrounded by minefields and barbed wire, assured any American advances would be costly. From 21 January to 1 February, the infantry and tankers slugged it out with German positions. With the spotlight on Company B, Danby presents a virtual play-by-play of the company's platoons and individual tanks. The battalion and accompanying infantry finally secured their sector, and the final chapter ends with the tankers gearing up to make their drive on Cassino itself.

Men of Armor will appeal to a broad audience, especially students and historians interested in the Mediterranean theater or American armor history. Armor historians will profit from the book's ground-level perspective of tank infantry teamwork, tactics, and leadership. Readers can nearly see officers scouting the terrain on their bellies, hear the reverb of artillery reports off the mountains, and smell the grease and cordite. That is not to suggest that the book carries a romantic flair or suffers from gratuitous passages. Instead, the author's syntax effectively packages Danby's exhaustive research on the leadership, sacrifice, skill, and courage of the soldiers of Company B. The intimacy of the narrative is a fresh reminder of the individual human dramas of the war.

Westin E. Robeson is an author and social studies teacher. His primary research and writing interests focus on the history of American armor. He is the author of *Buttoned Up: American Armor and the 781st Tank Battalion in World War II* (Texas A&M University Press, 2018). He has organized and served on panels concerning American armor history. He holds a master's degree in American military history from Norwich University and a bachelor's degree in secondary education from the University of Cincinnati.

NOTE

1. Theodore Roosevelt, "History as Literature" (Annual address of the President of the American Historical Association, Boston, MA, 27 Dec 1912), https://www.historians.org/about-aha-and-membership/aha-history-and-archives/presidential-addresses/theodore-roosevelt.



PROUD WARRIORS: AFRICAN AMERICAN COMBAT UNITS IN WORLD WAR II

By Alexander M. Bielakowski

University of North Texas Press, 2021
Pp. ix, 335. $29.95

Review by Bradley J. Sommer

While the United States was fighting to defeat fascism and racism during World War II, it had to wrestle with the reality that racism, both individual and systemic, was widespread throughout its society. Within the military, this discrimination was particularly apparent. Whether in the Army, Navy, Marines, or Coast Guard, racism, particularly against African Americans, was ingrained in the U.S. military. This discrimination was a matter of formal and informal policy. Although the literature on the experience of African Americans in the war is extensive and varied, there is no definitive account of Black combat units in World War II. Alexander M. Bielakowski seeks to address this omission with his study on African American combat units, *Proud Warriors: African American Combat Units in World War II*. Aiming to do more than simply chronicle a partially known history, he argues that "without the efforts of these World War II African American combat [units], desegregation of the U.S. armed forces might have taken decades longer and the process of the Civil Rights

Movement might also have been hampered" (xii). Drawing on a wide array of scholarship and encompassing all branches of the military, Bielakowski lays out a comprehensive history that has thus far been missing from the literature.

One of the great strengths of Bielakowski's book is the attention he pays to context. Before he delves into World War II, he offers a crisp and concise summary on the history of African Americans in combat, all the way back to the Revolutionary War. He suggests that most White Americans likely assumed African Americans were reluctant to serve in the military, an assumption based on racist tropes. Demonstrating that African Americans have always served, he lays a historical foundation for the central conceit of the book, namely that Black service members not only have served and served honorably but that their service in the U.S. armed forces was one part of the larger struggle for civil rights. In that context, Bielakowski also details the experiences of famous Black combat units, such as the 54th Massachusetts Infantry Regiment in the Civil War, forecasting the rest of the book. What differs between the experiences of African Americans before and during World War II, though, is the scale of their participation. He says, "The sheer scale of World War II made it a learning experience for all of the U.S. armed forces when it came to African Americans, their potential, and their place in American society" (42).

The central scope of the book, though, is World War II. Rather than telling a linear story across the European and Pacific Theaters, Bielakowski chooses to take each branch of the military on its own, drilling down into specific subbranches and corps, to unpack the experience of African Americans throughout the military. He structures the book into thematic sections—such as "Grunts," "Combat Arms at a Distance," "Mobile Warfare and Mechanical Proficiency,"—and the chapters focus on discrete branches and subbranches—"Infantry," "Marine Corps," and "Field Artillery." This allows him to focus on each branch's and corps's nuances, experiences, and legacies. Overwhelmingly, African Americans were shuttled into noncombat roles, usually around dirty, dangerous, and physically demanding tasks. These roles were different across the branches. In the Navy, for example, it was nearly impossible to keep sailors segregated especially at sea. Black sailors were often cooks or cooks' assistants. Generally, though, the universal experience was that African Americans were rarely if ever, put into combat roles. This only changed when branches were given a mandate, such as in 1942 when President Roosevelt ordered the Marine Corps to admit African Americans into their ranks.

Bielakowski covers very wide ground here. The detail in some of the branch descriptions is impressive, as are the nuances of specific, well-known units and individuals. He covers service members from boot camp to battlefield and beyond, even detailing the experiences of some African American veterans who made a career out of the military or those who struggled to obtain the recognition—formal or informal—they deserved from their honorable service. He encompasses military service, but where the book shines is in the treatment of specific units and individuals. One of the book's strongest sections is Jackie Robinson's experience, including his court-martial (Robinson was found not guilty, and the charges are widely considered to have been racially motivated). Another substantial area of the book is Bielakowski's attention to the actual service of African American troops. He aptly demonstrates that Black service members performed well in combat across branches and theaters, opening the door for President Truman's eventual desegregation of the armed services in 1948.

Bielakowski's approach, although thorough, does create a choppy narrative. Not telling the story in a linear fashion, tracing the history of Black combat units in the war from start to finish in one description, makes it hard to see larger trends and patterns. Change over time is a critical aspect of historical analysis, and that missing component weakens the grander narrative, and the larger argument. Bielakowski is incredibly well grounded in the literature on World War II and African American service members specifically. A review of the notes and additional reading demonstrates this quite clearly. A piece of literature that is not as well covered is African American history more broadly. His choice not to use historical terminology and the lack of contemporary language suggests that he is not entirely grounded in this field. This is most apparent with the larger literature on civil rights. The claim that Black service members "hastened" the Civil Rights Movement is not quite proven here. Given the immense literature on the development of the Civil Rights Movement, more direct interaction with the literature and clearer historical evidence supporting this claim would have helped. Readers looking to learn more about this connection will be disappointed outside the sections on well-known social advocates like Robinson.

Finding a gap in a widely and thoroughly studied subject, like World War II, is challenging. Although his work relies heavily on secondary sources, Bielakowski's synthesis of vast literature creates a comprehensive volume on an important story in the history of the United States military. Historians of World War II will likely not find much new in this book, but for readers who are less familiar with the history of African Americans in the military, Bielakowski has produced an effective, informative, and thorough introduction on an important topic and, for the first time, all in one place.

Dr. Bradley J. Sommer is a Research Fellow at the U.S. Center of Military History at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C. He received his PhD in United States History from Carnegie Mellon University. Specializing in labor, urban, and African American history in the twentieth century, he is currently working on a book titled "Tomorrow Never Came: Toledo, Ohio, and the Making of the Postindustrial Midwest."



NATIONS IN THE BALANCE: THE INDIA-BURMA CAMPAIGNS, DECEMBER 1943–AUGUST 1944

BY CHRISTOPHER L. KOLAKOWSKI

Casemate Publishers, 2022
Pp. xix, 219. $34.95

REVIEW BY IVAN A. ZASIMCZUK

One of the causes of World War II was the Japanese desire to be fully autarkic. To accomplish this, the Japanese Empire expanded away from mainland China and Korea, already under their control, and toward the territories of the United States and European colonies in the resource-rich South Pacific, Southeast Asia, and the Indian subcontinent. After invading some of these lands, the Japanese waged fierce battles against the Allies in India and Burma to consolidate and secure the western flank of their new empire and cut American material aid to China. In *Nations in the Balance: The India-Burma Campaigns, December 1943–August 1944*, Christopher L. Kolakowski tells the history of how the Allies won two decisive campaigns: winning at Imphal and Kohima and stopping the Japanese invasion of India; and the successful American effort in northern Burma to take Myitkyina.

At 174 pages of actual text, Kolakowski's book is dense. Its opening prologue of Operation LONGCLOTH is a good primer for the successive nine chapters. Although generally chronological, the chapters make geographic and temporal transitions between the fronts and have thematic developments. There is no mystery to his approach. The work does not challenge any interpretation of these events nor falsely ascribe to their deeper meaning. It is a full-speed-ahead, undiluted, frontal assault on these campaigns. He makes but one grand and demonstrably true claim, even if overly general: "The winners and losers of these battles both decided World War II in Asia and influenced the next 75 years of Asian history" (vii). The result is a highly readable and engrossing text, richly adorned with strategic nuances, operational art, tactical accounts of vicious jungle battles, and some of the most fascinating leaders of World War II or any era.

Kolakowski enumerates the complexities of managing the theater for the Allies (8). The divergent strategic objectives of the British and Americans were at the forefront of these intricacies. The division of the area reflected these national interests. The United States retained strategic direction of the China Theater with its mission to keep Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Chinese fighting against the Japanese. India Command, which directed the defense of India and Burma, was under British authority (8). The British were fixated on preserving the empire by reclaiming Burma, Singapore, and Malaysia's lost territories and maintaining their hold on the Indian subcontinent.

Conversely, the Americans had every incentive to keep the Chinese struggle against the Japanese going. The Chinese tied down an enormous Japanese Army that might otherwise have been repositioned against Americans in the Pacific campaigns. These divergent interests between the Allies resulted, at times, in a less than unified approach against the Japanese and a competition for resources. If Allied actions were disjointed, the Japanese did not perceive it as such. Instead, these actions created problems for them across multiple fronts, stretching their resources and manpower to the breaking point. Also woven into the text is the author's awareness of the role of race and nationality within the Allied coalition. Kolakowski excels at sorting out these issues and delivering great narratives of pivotal campaigns.

The alluring cast of characters makes this narrative even more compelling, and none more so than the two protagonists: the imperious Lord Louis Mountbatten, a member of the British royal family and overall Allied Commander, and Lt. Gen. Joseph W. "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell, his American deputy. Stilwell was subordinate to Mountbatten as deputy but was also commander of the China Theater in his own right. Stilwell simultaneously held four positions, each with a different set of authorities, missions, and bosses. In addition to Mountbatten, he answered as chief of staff to Chiang and as the commander of the U.S. Army Forces in the CBI (China-Burma-India) Theater to the U.S. Joint Chiefs (10). The unresolved tensions between the Allies regarding competing strategic objectives resulted in leaders being at cross-purposes and command dysfunction. Kolakowski discusses one major occurrence. In January 1944, Mountbatten and Stilwell sent separate delegations to their respective nations. Mountbatten sought approval to land in northern Sumatra in preparation for a broader invasion of Malaysia or Thailand. Stilwell sought to ensure it was not approved because it would divert necessary manpower away from opening the land road to China (43–44). The landings were not approved by either nation.

Two legendary fighters met in these jungles: Briton Orde C. Wingate, commander of the Chindits and American Frank D. Merrill, commander of the 5307th Composite Unit, better known as Merrill's Marauders. These leaders and others, along with their forces, accomplished herculean tasks in environments that posed as much danger as did the Japanese. Kolakowski also introduces other influential leaders such as British General William Slim, American airpower enthusiast Claire L. Chennault, and future American Secretary of State D. Dean Rusk. He also gives equal measure to the Japanese leaders and their ambitious plans to wrest these lands from the Allies and end European rule and American influence over them.

Air power receives its proper due as an explanation of the outcomes of the campaigns in India and Burma. Air power made enormous contributions by sustaining the forces and providing fire support during the operations. Kolakowski makes it clear that the outcomes of the battles depended heavily on the ability to sustain them properly and support them with aerial bombardments. Often the forces of either side could not exploit their successes for lack of sustainment and the dearth of valuable aircraft, which were in high demand all over the theater. Allied forces relied so heavily

on airpower that they planned campaigns around capturing airfields and improving them once captured. No issue better demonstrates the effect of divergent Allied interests than the fight for this operational resource. At one point, Mountbatten requested that Stilwell's Chindits cease fighting to keep the Burma Road open into China, so that transport aircraft could be diverted to the Imphal-Kohima front in India. General George C. Marshall, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, personally intervened and articulated the clearest break between British and American interests when he supported Stilwell's operations and use of aircraft to continue supporting the Chinese (128).

Twenty-two maps tremendously enhance and add significant value to the narrative. Explaining a compelling battle narrative is so much easier when accompanied by good visual aids. These are essential in helping readers to understand complicated sequences better. The book has sixteen pages of excellent photos, allowing readers to meet the dramatis personae and encounter, without imagining, the terrain and scarred landscapes. Without these, readers might lose interest in seemingly indistinguishable battles.

This book succeeds because it extends the consensus of the brutality of jungle warfare in the CBI and, most importantly, makes these epic events accessible. For whatever it may lack in original analysis, it is a stark reminder of the primacy of several warfighting functions—Sustainment, Fires, and Mission Command—and potentially foreshadows how complex future wars may be. It delivers quality narrative and introspective content for those who love tactics, operations, and strategy. For these reasons, this work can have broad appeal. However, it is best for operational and strategic level planners and commanders who might need to orchestrate and lead these campaigns in the future.

Ivan A. Zasimczuk has been the military history instructor in the Signal History Office, Office Chief of Signal, Fort Gordon, Georgia, since June 2019. He graduated from the University of California at Davis (UCD) with a bachelor's degree in history and political science and a minor in English. He joined the Army through the UCD ROTC and entered the active-duty Army in 1997 as an Adjutant General Officer. He has served in Germany, Bosnia, Kosovo, Kuwait, Iraq, and Jordan. He attended Kansas State University, earning a master's degree in history with a follow-on teaching assignment at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, where he taught Military History and Leadership. He ended his career in 2017, managing a marketing portfolio in the Army Marketing and Research Group. He then worked at the British Embassy in Washington, D.C., for one year before assuming his current role.



BLACKHORSE TALES: STORIES OF 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY TROOPERS AT WAR

By Donald C. Snedeker

Casemate, 2021
Pp. x, 292. $34.95

Review by Jason A. Yanda

In *Blackhorse Tales: Stories of 11th Armored Cavalry Troopers at War*, Donald C. Snedeker, the historian of the 11th Armored Cavalry Veterans of Vietnam and Cambodia, has returned an outstanding companion to his previous book, *The Blackhorse in Vietnam: The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in Vietnam and Cambodia, 1966–1972* (Casemate, 2020). Building on the operational history of the previous work, *Blackhorse Tales* provides seven chapters that bring color to the experience of not only the troops of the Blackhorse regiment, but their operating environment (the terrain and weather), their loved ones, their South Vietnamese allies, and their Vietnamese opponents—even their pets and mascots.

The first chapter, "The Troopers," provides a broad overview of the life of the soldiers in the regiment. From initial enlistment or draft through training and deployment to Vietnam, Snedeker succinctly captures the sights, sounds, scents, feelings, and perceptions that accompanied a routine day for armored cavalry in their armored fighting vehicles, the terror of a firefight, the exhilaration of surviving contact with the enemy, and the momentary bits of relaxation snatched during holidays or refit periods at a rear area base camp.

"The Families" is the second chapter and covers the impressions of family members of the Blackhorse troops. Before the soldiers departed for Vietnam, family members began to feel the impending loss, whether due to extended training for the initial unit deployment in 1966 or for later replacements who joined the regiment as individuals. While deployed to Vietnam, the primary means of contact was through letters, which could arrive quickly or be delayed by various exigencies of combat. Care packages also provided a connection between family and troops and small, luxurious reminders of home, like popcorn, flavored drink mixes, and other treats. Snedeker's description of the links between the Blackhorse troops, their families, and the unit continues after Vietnam and up to the present day. Especially poignant are the stories of the spouse and children of a surviving soldier hearing stories from their veteran's comrades or the survivors of a deceased soldier meeting his surviving comrades and thereby gaining closure for their loss.

The third chapter, "The Civilians and Allies," covers the myriad of individuals outside the regiment that Blackhorse troops would interact with during Vietnam. American civilians were represented most commonly by Red Cross workers, the famous "Donut Dollies," who were American women employed to bring a touch of home to raise the troops' morale. The dealings with Vietnamese civilians and military are presented mainly through the memories of the Blackhorse troops than through their own words, although some Vietnamese voices are represented as well. Maybe the most interesting anecdote collected by

Snedeker is the story of trooper David Wright meeting the Vietnamese soldier who had tried to kill him in an ambush in 1967 when the Vietnamese soldier had become a Kit Carson Scout and was serving with the Blackhorse.

In addition to the three chapters about the people around the Blackhorse regiment, Snedeker devotes three chapters to environmental conditions. "The Animals" covers the mascots and pets of the unit: primarily dogs and monkeys, but also a goat kept by the 409th Radio Research Detachment, a chicken, a parrot, and a mongoose. This chapter also includes the ants, bats, snakes, and wild monkeys that plagued the regiment during its operations. "The Land" describes the troops' memories and interactions with the topography in Vietnam, primarily the jungle, where the enemy maintained most of its base camps, but also the cultivated rice paddy fields and plantations that posed challenges for the regiment's activities. The roads that the regiment sought to secure for the government of South Vietnam are included in this chapter also. Finally, "The Weather" describes hot and not quite so hot dry seasons from November until February and the torrential downpours of the rainy season from May through September.

Interspersed among these topical chapters are six shorter vignettes of combat operations, each representative of the activities of one of the regiment's six calendar years in Vietnam. Each of the six vignettes showcases the flexibility provided by the armored firepower inherent in the armored cavalry regiment, with its tanks and armored cavalry assault vehicles. Whether responding to the ambush of another unit in their regiment or reinforcing light airmobile infantry units or Vietnamese militia units, the Blackhorse demonstrated the application of mobile, protected firepower throughout its deployment in Vietnam.

The book's final chapter, "Life After Vietnam," again covers a wide swath of experiences in a few short pages with representative anecdotes. From successful military (six of the regiment's ten commanders in Vietnam became general officers, with two rising to four-star rank) and successful civilian careers to lifelong struggles with wartime physical injuries and post-traumatic stress disorder, Blackhorse veterans span the gamut of post-Vietnam experiences.

Snedeker's book provides the results of more than twenty years of interactions with Blackhorse veterans and their families in a well-presented and easy-to-read manner. Clearly a labor of love for this Blackhorse veteran and association historian, *Blackhorse Tales* presents the memories of Vietnam and its impacts on this unique unit and its members. Although it is not an operational history, it provides an overview of the regiment's activities and provides the reader with a sense of involvement in the experiences of Vietnam. In addition to the engaging prose, the vast array of visual information, with photos, sketches, and maps on nearly every page, draws the reader into the experience.

Jason A. Yanda retired in 2022 after over twenty-five years as a field artillery officer. He holds a bachelor's degree in political science, a master's of military art and science, and a master's of strategic studies. He is a PhD candidate in American studies at Pennsylvania State University.



LESSONS UNLEARNED: THE U.S. ARMY'S ROLE IN CREATING THE FOREVER WARS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

By Pat Procter

University of Missouri Press, 2020
Pp. xvii, 486. $40

Review by Wm. Shane Story

Lessons Unlearned: The U.S. Army's Role in Creating the Forever Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq is both a mess and a witless disavowal of the oath the author swore to defend the Constitution. Pat Proctor's intent was little more than a trap he set for himself. *Lessons Unlearned*, he writes, "is not intended merely as a simple history or an exercise in laying blame for past sins . . . It is instead an intervention because the U.S. Army is in the process of making the same mistake again" (7). The result is an act of frustration played out at the time of writing in 2017 and 2018 when the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq seemed interminable. Disheartened by these and earlier conflicts dating back to the Cold War, Proctor laments, "it has been a painfully long time since the U.S. Army conclusively won a war" (25). What comes of combining a so-called simple history, an indictment, an intervention, and grief is a jeremiad full of sound and fury.

Nonetheless, there are things to learn from poking through the debris. *Lessons Unlearned* is a tragedy shaped by reductionism and delivered through repetition, which begins on page three and never stops. Twice in a single paragraph, Proctor repeats the phrases "fighting and winning" battles, "imposing one's will on an opponent," and "since the end of the Korean War" (3). His repetition is deliberate, and he acknowledges this approach later when he writes, "as has been mentioned repeatedly throughout this book" (263). Reading the same words again and again is tedious, but is it detrimental? Yes, because the sheer volume of useless repetition obscures the glaring mistakes that should have been corrected before publication. For example, the 2006 version of Field Manual (FM) 3–24, *Counterinsurgency,* stressed that commanders need to comprehend how politics shape conflicts.[1] Proctor offers the jaw-dropping interpretation that FM 3–24 features a "repeated insistence that in a counterinsurgency it is the Army's job to identify and solve the country's political problems" (7).

Proctor's reductionism consists of seeing everything associated with the Army as a simple tragedy reenacted time and again over the last five decades. With the telling exceptions of David H. Petraeus and H. R. McMaster, Proctor reduces Army generals to the oblivious caricatures needed to perform their assigned roles in his script. Additionally, by ignoring contextual differences between administrations, security threats, regional interests, and domestic pressures,

Proctor obliterates distinctions between operations conducted decades apart on opposite sides of the globe, between Haiti in 1994 and Afghanistan in 2014. This is why, as Proctor explains, "it is difficult to avoid seeing a repeating pattern" (19).

In Proctor's tragedy, the Army consists of just two groups: the establishment that wields power and the mavericks who challenge power. The two are locked perpetually in a dialectical struggle over Army doctrine. Because the establishment is obsessed with large-scale combat operations, it devotes nearly all the Army's resources to big combat formations of armor, artillery, and mechanized infantry. The mavericks, recognizing that the Army keeps deploying heavy combat units to low-intensity conflicts for which they are not prepared, which causes them to fail every time, keep writing lessons learned and pushing reform efforts to help the Army succeed in the next low-intensity conflict. Alas, the establishment keeps suppressing those lessons and refusing to reform, lest those changes undermine preparations for large-scale combat. This pattern began in 1973, when the establishment "actively expunged the lessons of Vietnam" (7, 30). Every subsequent operation followed the same tragic pattern: failure, lessons, suppression; failure, lessons, suppression. The result, once the war on terror began, was the "deliberately engineered incompetence" that made a shambles of Afghanistan and Iraq (3).

In his quest to end this dialectical struggle and start winning again, Proctor assumes "there will never be another great power war" because the great powers will always avoid direct conflict due to the certainty of nuclear escalation. Further, he assumes that large-scale combat operations are a unique feature of great power war; without the one, there is no need to prepare for the other (10). Therefore, the Army can shift resources and efforts to win low-intensity conflicts. Proctor's reasoning is inexplicable, given the warfare that leveled Mosul while he was writing; the subsequent Russian war in Ukraine—and staunch Western support of the latter—renders these assumptions risible.

Proctor believes the Army should assume greater political responsibilities. His sources, generally proponents of low-intensity conflict doctrine, reasonably argue that the Army needs to comprehend the political dimensions of such conflicts. Proctor takes this argument a drastic step further: the Army "must admit that the political dimension of low-intensity conflict is *the Army's* responsibility" (408). He would have the Army elbow aside host-nation governments, the State Department, and all others to impose by force of arms whatever political solution the Army deems appropriate. To ease the process, the Army must "back a winner" among indigenous factions and ensure that the faction dominates its rivals in the postconflict settlement on terms amenable to the United States (408). Besides the practical difficulties of Proctor's approach, there is no room in the U.S. Constitution or law for the Army to assert its suzerainty over U.S. foreign policy or over questions as to when, where, to what ends, and on whose behalf it conducts military operations.

Astonishingly, Proctor pulls the rug out from under his own thesis by discarding one of his purported lessons about Vietnam—the importance of "protecting the population" (33). This idea also figures prominently in Field Manual 3–24.[2] Further, Proctor blames the Army establishment for producing commanders involved in unlawful civilian killings in Iraq (6). Nonetheless, he endorses violence against civilians three times: as a means of imposing one's will on the opponent's people (3); in acknowledging, but accepting, that making civilians "a target of violence [stretches] Clausewitz's definition of war" (15); and finally by stressing that the point of war is to use violence to impose "a political solution on a country's people and political leadership against their will" (25). According to General Mark A. Milley, targeting civilians "is a war crime."[3]

Proctor has the experience and education needed to write with some authority, and doctrinal debates from Vietnam to Iraq are a worthy subject. David Fitzgerald published an excellent study on this topic in 2013.[4] Proctor, however, does not seek to understand the past, but to reject constraints on the use of force. In a revealing passage, he dismisses as "wrongheaded" a field manual's emphasis on the need for legitimacy in military operations, arguing instead that "force or the threat of force" establish all the legitimacy one needs (124). What can one say? Any doctrine that rejects the Constitution, law, and morality is useless to the United States Army.

Dr. Wm. Shane Story, a retired Army Reserve colonel, is a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He has a PhD in history from Rice University and deployed to Iraq as a historian with the Coalition Land Forces Component Command in 2003 and with the Multi-National Force–Iraq in 2007–2008.

NOTES

1. Field Manual 3–24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), 2-14, 3-20, 3-31, 6-17, B-2.
2. Ibid., 1–2.
3. Dan Lamothe, "Pentagon's Top General Meets Ukrainians Training with U.S. Troops," *Washington Post*, 16 Jan 2023.
4. David Fitzgerald, *Learning to Forget: US Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013).

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HISTORICAL ADVISORY SUBCOMMITTEE

Jon T. Hoffman

The onset of the pandemic in 2020 derailed that year's meeting of the Department of the Army Historical Advisory Subcommittee (DAHAS). In 2021, the new administration undertook a zero-based review of all Federal Advisory Committees, which involved reapproval of committee charters and membership. The Department of Defense recently completed that process for the DAHAS and its parent, the Army Education Advisory Committee. I am very happy to report that we survived that examination and retain our status as the oldest historical advisory committee in the federal government. The reconstituted subcommittee will convene for its first meeting on 25–26 August. The first day will take place at the Museum Support Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and the second day will be at the National Museum of the United States Army. This will give the members a firsthand look at the National Museum, which was not yet open at the time of the last subcommittee gathering. It also will be an opportunity for them to see how the museum system supports the overall Army historical program and the efforts of the Center of Military History (CMH) to inculcate historical mindedness throughout the U.S. Army.

After the long hiatus, there are a number of new faces on the subcommittee and a change in leadership. Our longtime chair, Dr. Rob Citino of the National World War II Museum, has retired from the group following many years of yeoman service. We will miss his wealth of knowledge in the field of military history, his sage advice, and his camaraderie. Dr. Beth Bailey has stepped up to take his place. A member since 2015, she is a professor at the University of Kansas and director of the Center for Military, War, and Society Studies there. Her areas of expertise encompass the All-Volunteer Force—a timely topic given the current difficulties the services face in meeting recruiting goals.

We are lucky to have a couple of other members returning from the prepandemic subcommittee. Dr. Andy Wiest from the University of Southern Mississippi brings to the table his knowledge of the Vietnam War. In addition to his work on the subcommittee, CMH has relied heavily on him for external review panels as we wrap up our Vietnam official history series. Dr. Wayne Lee of the University of North Carolina has a wide background in the cultural aspects of conflict, as well as experience in the field of archeology and teaching at the Army War College.

Dr. William Allison joins us from Georgia Southern University as another Vietnam historian, and he has been a visiting professor at the Army War College, the U.S. Air Force School for Advanced Air and Space Studies, and the U.S. Air Force Air War College. Dr. Adrian Lewis also hails from the University of Kansas, with an emphasis on World War II, the Korean War, and the American culture of war. He has been a professor of military science at the University of California, Berkeley, and taught at West Point and the Naval War College. Dr. Kara Vuic at Texas Christian University specializes in women's military history. Dr. Chad Williams of Brandeis University brings a deep background in African American military history and World War I.

In addition to me, the ex officio members of the subcommittee are Lt. Gen. Milford H. Beagle Jr., Commanding General of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center; Mr. Michael D. Formica, Executive Deputy to the Commanding General of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command; Brig. Gen. Shane R. Reeves, dean of the Academic Board of the U.S. Military Academy; and Dr. David D. Dworak, Provost of the U.S. Army War College. We have two vacancies in the external academia portion of the subcommittee, and plan to fill them in the coming months.

Speaking of committees, at the end of May we held the meeting of the external review panel for Mark Reardon's manuscript on the U.S. Army's role in building the Iraqi security forces. The members were Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik (retired), Dr. Conrad C. Crane from the Army War College, Dr. Greg A. Daddis of San Diego State University, Dr. Carter Malkasian of the Naval Postgraduate School, Col. John R. Martin (retired), Dr. Ken M. Pollack of the American Enterprise Institute, and Dr. Don P. Wright of the Combined Arms Center. Their detailed and insightful comments are proving extremely useful in guiding Reardon's revision of the manuscript, which should be completed early in 2024. Two other book manuscripts will go to external panel in the next few months: Dr. Nick Schlosser's work on the surge in Iraq and Dr. Erik Villard's Vietnam 1968–1969 volume.



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